TAASISI YA SAYANSI JAMII (TASAJA)

TANZANIAN ASSOCIATION OF SOCIOLOGISTS

THE 1ST TANZNIAN NATIONAL SOCIOLOGICAL CONFERENCE

SAINT AUGUSTINE UNIVERSITY OF TANZANIA

MAY 28-30, 2015

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WELCOMING NOTE

Reverend Dr. Thadeus Mkamwa

VICE CHANCELLOR SAUT

CHAPTER ONE

WHO IS WHO- THE KEY NOTE SPEAKERS

SARI HANAFI

Current Position

2014: Vice President (National Associations) International Sociological Association

2005: Associate professor in American University of Beirut: Teaching sociology.

ACADEMIC QUALIFICATIONS

1994 **Ph. D. in Sociology** (new regime), Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales-Paris.
1989 **Master's degree (D.E.A**.) "Sciences et Techniques dans l'Histoire, la Culture et l'Organisation des sociétés", University of Strasbourg..
1987 **B.A. Sociology**, Damascus University,
1984 **B. SC. Civil Engineering**, Damascus University,

Research and Teaching Interests

- Economic sociology and network analysis of the Palestinian Diaspora and refugees;
- sociology of migration (mainly about the Palestinian refugees) ;
- relationships between Diasporas and center;
- sociology of return migration;
- transnationalism;
- sociology of the new actors in international relations (NGOs and international NGOs);
- civil society;
- elite formation;
- Paradigms and methodology in social sciences.

WORKS:

Hanafi is the author of numerous journal articles and book chapters on the political and economic sociology of the Palestinian diaspora and refugees; sociology of migration; transnationalism; politics of scientific research; civil society and elite formation and transitional justice.

SELECTED PUBLICATION:

- *Bayna 'alamayn. Rijal al-a'mal al falastiniyyin fi al-shatat wa bina al qayan al falastini (Between Two Worlds: Palestinian Businessmen in the Diaspora and the Construction of a Palestinian Entity)* (1996) two editions: Cairo, Dar al-Mostaqbal al-arabi, & Ramallah: Muwatin (Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy), January (Arabic).
- *La Syrie des ingénieurs. Perspective comparée avec l'Egypte* (1997) Paris : Karthala.
- *Entre Deux Mondes. Les hommes d'affaires palestiniens et la construction de l'entité palestinienne* (1997) Cairo : CEDEJ.
- *Business Directory of Palestinian in the Diaspora* (1998) Jerusalem: Biladi (In English, French and Arabic).
- *Hona wa honaq : nahwa tahlil lil 'alaqa bin al-shatat al-falastini wa al markaz (Here and There: Towards an Analysis of the Relationship between the Palestinian Diaspora and the Center)* (2001) Ramallah : Muwatin, Jerusalem : Institute of Jerusalem Studies (distribution Beirut : Institute of Palestine Studies)
- (Ed.) *Crossing borders, shifting boundaries: Palestinian Dilemmas* (2008) American University in Cairo Press.
- Adi Ophir and Michal Giovanni and S. Hanafi (Ed.) *The Power of Inclusive Exclusion: Anatomy of Israeli Rule in the Occupied Palestinian Territories* (2009) New York: Zone Books.
- Are Knudsen and S. Hanafi (Eds.) *Palestinian Refugees: Identity, Space and Place in the Levant* (2010) Routledge

Gay Seidman

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Education:

Ph.D., Sociology, University of California, Berkeley, 1990
M.A., Demography, University of California, Berkeley, 1989
M.A., Sociology, University of California, Berkeley, 1982
B.A. (summa cum laude), Social Studies, Harvard University, 1978

Areas of Interest:

Sociology of economic change and development; labor; gender; social movements; political sociology; demography

Affiliations: Center for Demography and Ecology; Havens Center

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS:

Visiting Fellow, Princeton Institute of International and Regional Studies, 2008-9
Vilas Associate Fellowship, UW-Madison, 2005-7
Departmental Teaching Award, Sociology, UW-Madison, 1997
Phi Beta Kappa, Dec. 1977
University of California Regents' fellowships, 1981-1983
Distinguished Graduate Instructor Award, 1986
John L. Simpson Memorial Fellowship, 1986-1988
Hewlett Foundation Training Grant in Demography, 1988-9
TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

1990-present, Assistant professor to Professor, Sociology Department, University of Wisconsin-Madison
2009-present, Director of African Studies, UW-Madison
2009-present, Director of Development Studies, UW-Madison
2004-2005, Director (interim), International Studies program, UW-Madison
2001-2004 Associate Chair, Sociology Department
1996- 99, Director of Global Studies, University of Wisconsin-Madison
1995-96, Associate professor, Sociology and Public Policy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor (tenured at Michigan, on leave from Madison)
1992-93: Visiting lecturer, Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa
1987-89: Instructor, Sociology, Univ. of California, Berkeley
1985-86: Instructor, Peace and Conflict Studies Program, UC-Berkeley
1987: Instructor, History program, New College of San Francisco
1984: Teaching assistant, Sociology, UC-Berkeley
Also taught African Studies in high schools in Swaziland (1978-80) and Botswana (1983)

PUBLICATIONS:
"Brazil's pro-poor growth strategies," *Transformation* (South Africa), 2010

"Social Labeling in Export Chains: Can voluntary regulation end child labor," published at *India in Transition*, December 2009.

"Laboring under an illusion: Lesotho designs a 'sweat-free' label." *Third World Quarterly*. April 2009.

"Transnational labor campaigns: Can the logic of the market be turned against itself?" *Development and Change*, November 2008, pp. 991-1005

Beyond the Boycott: Labor Rights, Human Rights and Transnational Activism, 2007. American Sociological Association Rose Series. Russell Sage Foundation, September 2007.

'"The Femocrats' Dilemma: Mobilization vs. Representation in the South African Gender Commission,"*Feminist Studies*, spring 2004.

"Guerrillas in their Midst: Armed Struggle in the South African Anti-Apartheid Movement," *Mobilization: An international social movement journal*, 6:2 (Fall 2001): 111-128.

Manufacturing Militance: Workers' Movements in Brazil and South Africa, 1970-1985 (University of California Press, 1994)

GUY STANDING

Professor of Development Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London;

A founder member and honorary co-president of the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN), a non-governmental organisation that promotes a citizenship income for all.

CONTACT

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UNIVERSITY EDUCATION

1973-1977: PhD in economics, University of Cambridge, UK

1972: MA in labour economics and industrial relations, University of Illinois, USA

1968-1971: BA in economics, University of Sussex, UK

CAREER
CURRENT PROFESSIONAL POSITION

From October 2012: Professor of Development Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London

Previous Professional Positions

August 2006-January 2013: Professor of Economic Security, University of Bath, UK

April 2006-February 2009: Professor of Labour Economics, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia

June 1999-March 2006: Director, Socio-Economic Security Programme, International Labour Organisation, Geneva

1998-1999: Member of "Transition Team" of ILO Director-General Elect, Juan Somavia

1996-1998: Director, Special ILO Project on Global Labour Flexibility

1994-1996: Director of Labour Market Policies, Employment Department, ILO

1992-1994: Director, ILO Central and Eastern European Team, Budapest

1985-1992: Coordinator of Labour Market Research, Employment Department, ILO

1975-1985: Economist and Senior Economist, Population and Labour Policies Branch, Employment and Development Department, ILO

Recent Publications

Books

Basic Income: A Transformative Policy for India (with S. Davala, R. Jhabvala and S.Kapoor Mehta (London and New Delhi, Bloomsbury Academic, 2015).

A Precariat Charter: From Denizens to Citizens (London and New York, Bloomsbury Academic, 2014

The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class (London and New York, Bloomsbury Academic, 2011).

The New Dangerous Class (Seoul, Jong-cheol Park Publishers, 2014).

Social Income and Insecurity: A Study in Gujarat, with J. Unni, R. Jhabvala and U. Rani (New Delhi, Routledge, 2010).

Work After Globalization: Building Occupational Citizenship (Cheltenham, UK, and Northampton, MA, Edward Elgar, 2009).

Reports

The Labour Market and Labour Policies in Gauteng (mimeo, 2010), background report for OECD Territorial Review: Gauteng City Region, South Africa (Paris, OECD, 2011).Report details :: OECD report

CHAPTER TWO:

COUNT DOWN TO THE CONFERENCE

I: Tanzanian Sociologists conference: Accurate Information as a tool of understanding

Taasisi ya Sayansi Jamii (TASAJA) the Tanzanian Association of Sociologists is a professional association established under Societies Act (2002) in November 2013 with the objective of advancing and realizing the goals of sociology in our society. Its membership is open to graduates of sociology, higher institutions running sociology programs, and individuals and/or collective individuals subscribing to its goals and mission. TASAJA is an active member of International Sociological Association (ISA).

The establishment of TASAJA was in response of the observation of two Tanzanians the Late Bishop Emeritus of Arusha Fortunatus Lukanima (an economist by academic formation) and the late professor Gabriel Mwaluko who noted that Tanzania was missing the collective input of sociologists in their collectivity.

A professional association (also called a professional body, professional organization, or professional society) is usually a nonprofit organization seeking to further a particular profession, the interests of individuals engaged in that profession and the public interest. Harvey (2004) defines it as a group of people in a learned occupation who are entrusted with maintaining control or oversight of the legitimate practice of the occupation.

On the other hand some scholars have written on professional bodies. For example Harvey, Mason, & Ward (1995) advance that professional association plays the role of:-Setting standard of practice; Ensuring compliance of these standards; Advance the profession; Safeguard public interest; Represent the interest of the professional; Maintain members' privileged and powerful position in the society; Monitoring of professional educational programs, and the updating of skills, and thus perform professional certification to indicate that a person possesses qualifications in the subject area; and Services to the community. Others advance that professional bodies plays the function of raising public awareness of the particular profession; developing professional excellence; Making award; and networking within and outside the profession.

The development of professional association is associated with the establishment of a particular profession procreated by the presence of trained individual whose occupation is permanently connected to the discipline. In that light the development of the sociologists association can be traced from Emile Durkheim. Emile Durkheim was responsible for the formal institutionalization of sociology as an academic discipline when he established the first

department of sociology at the University of Bordeaux in 1895 and the first sociological journal in 1896.

Reviewed literatures allow us to advance that international cooperation in sociology began in 1893 when René Worms (1869–1926) founded the **Institut International de Sociologie**. After WWW II sociologists established the International Sociological Association (ISA) in 1949. However, sociologists in the USA had established the American Sociological Association, the world's largest association of professional sociologists, in 1905.

In Tanzania, Sociology is taught at the third level of education system. Tanzania having attained her independence in 1961 established her first university in 1966. By 1968 the University of Dar es salaam (then University college of Dar es salaam) was running a department of sociology. Records show that as at 31.08.1968 the department of sociology had one professor, one senior lecturer, four lecturers, and one visiting lecturer. Since then the sociology department has grown and, many more have emerged with the establishment of more universities.

A simple unpublished survey conducted at the Saint Augustine of Tanzania by TASAJA, the department of sociology was established at its main campus (2006/2007), Mtwara and Tabora (2010/2011); and Bukoba and Mwenge (2011/2012). By November, 2014, 1250 individuals had earned their bachelor degree in sociology and 666 were still pursuing it from the SAUT family. Master program is conducted at main campus where it was introduced in the academic years 2009/2010 and as then 60 individuals had graduated while 44 were still work in progress. With the above information one can conclude that Tanzania have sociologists doing sociological work somewhere. And had all what is required to form their association.

One then may ask; what is sociology and what do sociologists do? Sociology is nothing but a scientific study of the society focusing on human beings in their own interaction and interaction with the environment. As for sociologists, these are society engineers.

In the endeavor to realize the goals of sociology in Tanzania, TASAJA is convening its first national conference which will be held in Mwanza at Saint Augustine University of Tanzania (SAUT) main campus from May 28- 30, 2015. The theme that will be guiding the conference reads: Society's Right not to Just Information but Accurate Information.

The theme takes us back to the history of sociology. Sociology arose out of the background of unprecedented fundamental changes stemming out of advancement of science and technology

aiming at solving social problems. Yes science and technology solved the identified social problem, but serious social problem emerged in the aftermath.

Leading philosopher of the time shifted their focus from universe and non human and turned to the society-human and the environment. The attempt wanted to gather information that they thought could make the user of that information understand, describe, and solve these serious social problems. They borrowed the methodology applied by hard scientists but modified them to fit human being.

The use of science improved the information from just information to accurate information, which we need and must apply as a tool of understating and describing things. Accurate information is also tool of solving social problems, decision making, good governance, and policy formulation.

The theme will remind the sociologists to thrive to be objective in their undertaking and stand out as a model to other professional and the society at large in manifesting the significance of accurate information when dealing with social issues.

The theme as broad as it will allow participants of the conference from Tanzania and outside Tanzania to present and deliberate on issues related to inequality, unemployment, governance, climate changes, social security, precariousness, and social evils which are evidently sweeping across our society.

That having been said it fair to conclude that the first national sociological conference of the Tanzanian sociologists will be a forum with the aim of Establishing a common stand; Sharing experience; Sharing the best practice of the professional; Advancing sociological knowledge; Exploring the most effective way of enhancing expertise in the field of sociology; discussing the teaching of sociology and the professional practice of being a sociologist; facilitating debate; networking; and professional development opportunities.

II: SOCIETY'S RIGHT NOT TO JUST INFORMATION, BUT ACCURATE INFORMATION

SOCIETY'S RIGHT NOT TO JUST INFORMATION, BUT ACCURATE INFORMATION will be a theme of the first national conference for Tanzanian sociologists. The Tanzanian sociologists will convene at Saint Augustine university of Tanzania (SAUT) from May 28th to 30th, 2015. The formulation of the theme of the conference turned out to be a subject of hot debate.

Initially in the place of the word accurate, there was a word correct. Judith Blau from the Sociologist Without Border based in the US suggested the replacement. She argued that the premise was original and correct but assuredly, it must be the right to accurate information."Accurate" is essential. People have the right to accurate information. She added further that, there will be disagreement about what is accurate and truthful.

Those who opposed it advanced that the theme will not appeal to sponsors. On the other hand, these who thought it was befitting the first national sociological conference did so basing on the essence of sociology. They argued that accurate information was the very essence of sociology. Early sociologists were convertees from philosophy. The difference between the philosophers and sociologists arises from the object of their critical thinking focus. Philosophers critically think about the universe while sociologists' critical thinking focuses on the society. Sociologists then and now are preoccupied with the task of understanding the society, and with that understanding help to solve social problems in order to make the society a better place for survival of all.

Emeritus professor Therese Jacobs from Belgium contributed to the debate holding the view that the proposed theme for the first national sociological conference was of outmost relevance for societies today; especially in the context of elections. She added that even in a rather old democracy like her country Belgium, it is still a work in progress to improve the level of accuracy of problem definitions and of proposed solutions. She cited the latest initiative in several European countries to ask the Bureau of Planning (a neutral, administrative body) to calculate the costs and gains of the political solutions proposed by the different political fractions. She pointed out that Sociologists have a specific role to play in this respect of ensuring that the society access accurate information needed for decision making. Sociologists have the duty to unveil the ideological character of some problem analyses, for example by looking at the groups of persons that are being ignored.

What is accurate information? How does it differ with information? Why it is of concern to sociologists and other scientists?

Information is a body of knowledge generated in order to answer a raised and corresponding question or solves an identified problem. In contrast, accurate information results from the application of scientific process. Scientific process involves objective and accurate observation, collection and analysis of data, direct experimentation, and replication (repeating) of these procedures. Scientists affirm the importance of gathering information carefully, remaining unbiased when evaluating information, observing phenomena, conducting experiments, and accurately recording procedures and results. They are also skeptical about their results, so they repeat their work and have their findings confirmed by other scientists. Sociologists are not discarding unscientific generated information. Rather they are advancing that the information generated through the scientific

process prevails. Not only that, but it can accurately answer the question or be used to solve the identified problem.

In everyday life, individuals face situation where they raises questions that need answers and problems that demand solutions. In some instances, they could find information that could answers the questions or solve their problem. When such information could not bring about the stipulated results, the obvious turn to be that the used information was just information and not accurate information.

The above stated situation is what we are experiencing. Out there, we have a lot of information upon which we base to make decisions. How much of what we know about let say inequality, unemployment, poverty, climate change, corruption, governance, gender etc is based on accurate information.

The Tanzanian sociologists' conference is held in the election year. A lot of information is disseminated during the election process that is intended to make the voter make the choice and decision to vote or not to vote for a certain candidate of political party. Studies have shown that most of the information is just information and not accurate information.

In other societies, there are mechanisms to protect the society against just information. In the US, FactCheck.org a nonpartisan, nonprofit "consumer advocate was established with the aim to reduce the level of deception and confusion in U.S. politics; and to increase public knowledge and understanding. They monitor the factual accuracy of what is said by major U.S. political players in the form of TV ads, debates, speeches, interviews and news releases. In 2010, Full Fact was established in the United Kingdom with the goal of fact checking not only political claims, but also claim disseminated in the media outlet.

Accurate information is vital for decision making, policy formulation, and resource allocation in respect of and at the level of an individual, household, community, and nation. If we do not thrive to ensure that accurate information are generated and made available to the user, we are putting our survival in a great danger.

Sociologists have a duty of care and of leading the rest to make that possible. In that background, it is befitting to have it as a theme for the first national sociological conference. The theme will not only remind the sociologists the essence of sociology, but also the methodologies of generating, critiquing, and communicating accurate information on and about all issues individuals daily and across the life course.

III: WELL WISHES

Subject: RE: SOCIOLOGISTS CONFERENCE
From: "Jacobs Therese" <therese.jacobs@uantwerpen.be>
Date: Sat, March 14, 2015 10:07 am
To: "Bituro Kazeri" <tasaja@tasaja.org>
Priority: Normal
Status: Answered
Options: View Full Header | Print | Download this as a file

Dear Bituro,

The Phone call we had some hours ago was not an outstanding example of advances in global communication technology; I even didn't grasp your name... So I am glad that emailing is working well!

First of all I want to felicitate you with the start of your sociology association. Especially in a large country like Tanzania, it is a necessary tool to establish a common basis of relevant themes and appropriate analyses. This allows sociologists to share new insights.

The theme you have chosen for your first conference is of outmost relevance for societies today. Especially in the context of elections.
But even in a rather old democracy like Belgium it is still a work in progress to improve the level of accuracy of problem definitions and of proposed solutions. The latest initiative in several European countries is to ask the Bureau of Planning (a neutral, administrative body) to calculate the costs and gains of the political solutions proposed by the different political fractions. But this is only the first step, since there were a lot of discussions on the methods of calculation...

Sociologists have a specific role to play in this respect indeed. They are able to unveil the ideological character of some problem analyses, for example by looking at the groups of persons that are being ignored. So I wish you a lot of success with your conference.

I will not be able to travel to Mwanza. I am now retired for 3 years and therefore I have no financial support from my university anymore.

But it would be a pleasure for me to read critically abstracts or papers of participants and to suggest ways of improvement.

Kindly yours,

Therese Jacobs (em.prof.)

Subject: Re: INVITATION TO PUBLIC SPEAK IN TANZANIA
From: "Deborah Bryceson" <dfbryceson@bryceson.net>
Date: Fri, March 6, 2015 10:53 am
To: "Bituro Kazeri" <tasaja@tasaja.org>
Priority: Normal
Options: View Full Header | Print | Download this as a file

Dear Bitiri Kazeri,

Many thanks for your invitation to be a keynote speaker in Mwanza, Dodoma and Dar in late May. As a sociologist myself, and someone who has worked in and on Tanzania for a long time, I am delighted to hear that a Tanzanian Association of Sociologists is forming.

Alas, I very much regret but I won't be able to come to Tanzania in May due to a backlog of work commitments. I would have liked to visit St Augustine University. I have stayed in Mwanza several times in connection with mining studies over the past decade. It is a very dynamic city.

I wish you great success with the conference and with TAS.

Best wishes,

Deborah

P.S. I am attaching a couple book announcements with material on Tanzania. My articles in these books can be downloaded from the internet.

Dr Deborah Fahy Bryceson
Honorary Research Fellow
Centre of African Studies
University of Edinburgh
&
Deputy Director
International Gender Studies
Lady Margaret Hall
University of Oxford

Website: www.bryceson.net
Recent publication: Mining & Social Transformation in Africa (Routledge, 2014)

CHAPTER THREE

ABSTRACTS

"Precariety, Protests, and Citizenship: Could Demands for Urban Inclusion Reshape Development?

Professor Gay Seidman
University of Wisconsin - Madison
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Abstract

In the past decade, many cities of the global South have been roiled by new urban protests, as city residents demand better public services from their democratic governments. In Sao Paulo, New Delhi, Santiago and Johannesburg, urban activists have demanded expanded public education, transport, and health care. Challenging basic precepts of the 'Washington consensus', many of these protestors draw on expanded understandings of social rights, and express popular demands for greater social inclusion. In this paper, I explore some broad similarities across these movements; contrast these 'service-delivery' protests to historical social movement patterns; and consider whether these new movements might prompt democratic states to adopt more inclusive growth strategies.

Enhancing social innovations through action research: evidence and lessons from an empirical research in the fishing sector of Ukerewe District, Tanzania

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the important role of action research in underscoring and enhancing social innovations in communities. Conceptualizing social innovation as new ideas, strategies, services and products that individuals and organizations introduce and/or implement to redress societal challenges and meet their social, economic and political goals, I argue that well designed and executed action researches can provide participants with opportunities to reflect and develop shared understandings of individual and societal challenges and their possible solutions. In addition, action researches can provide participants with opportunities to share, critic and test novel ideas, strategies, services and products to eventually determine their effectiveness or ineffectiveness in facilitating the realization of envisioned socio-economic and political goals. Drawing on evidence and lessons from a recent action research in the fishing sector of Ukerewe, this paper illustrates how provision of adequate spaces to dialogue to both the challenged and

capable members eventually enables the unveiling and designing of credible, inclusive and workable innovative solutions to redress predominant individual and societal challenges.

Unemployment: the anatomy, origin and elusive solutions

Bituro Paschal Kazeri
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Abstract

This paper based on experience and the content review of public discourse; tries to look at the origin, anatomy, cause, and control measures of unemployment. The paper establishes that the causes of unemployment are well known; effort has been employed to control it; but the desirable result of a world where everyone could at least find job is not in sight. This seriously questions our good understanding of unemployment. Guided by historical, socialization, and incapability perspectives; the paper suggests that proper and adequate socialization could be the key to the survival in the prevailing society driven by culture of consumerism and money.

Key words: unemployment, work, consumerism, socialization

Rights of Internally Displaced Children in Kenya in the aftermath of Post Election Violence (PEV)

Prof.Tushar Kanti Saha

KUSOL, Kenyatta University

Abstract

Disasters, displacement and deprivation are common experience of humanity. However, human induced and human made disasters are distasteful and disparaging. People in Africa are continually devastated by human made disasters of political, cultural, ethnic and genocidal atrocities committed by the mindless actors taking tolls of life telling on untold miseries and manipulations. The children are caught in the crossfire of adult game by no fault of their own traumatising their existence with enactment of horrors and deprivation of childhood. Recruitment of child soldier by LRA, abduction of girl children by Boko Haram are the cruellest instances of coldblooded inhumanity perpetrated by the

offenders of crime against humanity. Internal or external armed conflicts compound the problem by throwing opportunities for the seekers of reign of terror.

The victims of all these events are also impacted by political fluid unleashed by electoral violence that happened in Kenya. The children suffered most in this theatre of violence orchestrated by the criminal minds which are at loggerheads with the justness of democratically held election results. Children affected by PEV in Kenya are a class by itself. The majority of Kenya's post-election violence took place in January and February, 2008. The fighting resulted in 1,133 casualties, at least 350,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs), approximately 2,000 refugees, significant, but unknown, numbers of sexual violence victims, and the destruction of 117,216 private properties and 491 government-owned properties including offices, vehicles, health centers and schools. Internally displaced persons comprise a huge number of families with children. The intention appeared to be not to kill them but rather to expel them and destroy their property. In many instances the police action added to the violence, with considerable evidence that officers took sides and used terror tactics against slum dwellers. People were displaced as a result of violence and threats of violence. They moved from their places of residence and business to places considered safe like police stations, administrative posts, churches and trading centers. Thereafter, they moved to formal camps or were integrated with their relatives and friends in urban centers or their ancestral homes. Children residing in displaced environment had been more affected than the adults apart from the instances of gang rape, schooling, nutrition, companionship and socialization which had become part of life. The physical, psychological and spiritual development of the children’s personality had been compromised and it is a problem staggering on the prospect of the nation. The Paper dwells on the deprivation of rights of children of IDP in Kenya under Child Rights Convention as well as national legal regime and examines how these issues have been addressed in PEV scenario.

Key Words: IDP, Rights of Children, Violence, Deprivation and Human Rights

CHAPTER FOUR

PAPERS

Challenging Times: the Crisis in South Africa's Labor Movement

Professor Gay Seidman
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Twenty years after Mandela was sworn in as his country's first democratically-elected president, labor sociologists still hold up South Africa's labor movement as a model of 'social movement unionism'.[1]Today, however, too many global labor analysts overlook a simple truth: a once-cohesive social force now lies in tatters, torn by internal division and political squabbles. To put it bluntly: the South African labor movement and the ANC coalition are fraying at the seams, and South Africa's unions struggle to mobilize broad support in the poor communities they still claim to represent. Tensions erupt frequently -- most dramatically, perhaps, in August 2012, when police shot and killed striking miners, but more persistently in frequent strikes and protests, and in COSATU's internal fights. Union membership has declined markedly, and in November 2014, COSATU officially expelled one of its largest affiliates. Seven more unions may leave on their own, threatening to create a new labor federation that will compete with their old labor allies for members, and with the African National Congress for power.

What has happened to South Africa's militant unionism, that model of community-based unionism, and to the labor-nationalist alliance that overthrew apartheid?

For labor scholars around the world, the conflicts within South Africa's labor unions today pose difficult questions. 'Social movement unionism' emerged in the context of authoritarian

[1] For comments on earlier versions, I am grateful to Janice Fine, Rina Agarwala, Ruth Milkman, and other participants in seminars at UW-Madison, New York University, University of California at San Diego, Notre Dame; and to Takeshi Wada and participants in the University of Tokyo's 2014 conference on "The Future of Democracy after Neo-Liberalism: Social Movements in a Globalizing World."

rule, where striking workers could assume broad support for their militant actions. Under democracy, new opportunities opened up for activists and for unions, creating new career paths and new instititutions, reshaping unions' membership, and redefining the relationship between organized labor and the state. At the same time, new labor processes and new management strategies have complicated unions' strategic choices, creating new tensions over tactics.

Born under apartheid's authoritarian industrialization strategies, South Africa's nonracial unions in the 1980s used their workplace strength strategically, disrupting production to challenge white-minority rule, and to demand broad economic, political and social transformation. In discussions of the labor's current turmoil, observers often focus on the country's political leadership, criticizing South Africa's post-apartheid government for its business-friendly policies and acquiescence to global capital. But that criticism overlooks dramatic changes in the labor movement itself, or the very different challenges created by labor's changing context. Although activists and observers continue to invoke that militant tradition, a romanticized vision of the past may not help us understand today's realities.

In the first part of this paper, I contrast a persistent nostalgic vision of South Africa's 'social movement unionism' with the more fractured reality of the present. Although many critics view the labor movement's problems as a reflection of neoliberal globalization, I suggest that the very process of democratization altered the terrain on which unions operate. New labor laws and reformed institutions have redefined union membership and patterns of representation. At the same time, major South African employers shifted hiring practices, in ways that both reflect, and sometimes reinforce, longstanding inequalities and legacies of racial exclusion. Meanwhile, political participation and new channels for claims-making make South Africa's democratic state a site of struggle as well as an object of protest -- complicating relationships between South Africa's unions and poor communities, and

contributing to the turmoil that seems likely to tear South Africa's once-unified labor movement apart.

Social movement unionism: a model in crisis?

For nearly forty years, South Africa's labor movement has been considered a model of militant unionism, linking workplace and community demands, emphasizing mobilization and collective action on behalf of a broadly-defined working class. Peter Waterman (1979 and 1999) first coined 'social movement unionism' to describe a strike in India, but the term resonated in South Africa, where workers' dancing, chanting, militant protests became central to the struggle against apartheid by the late 1970s (Freidman, 1987; Webster, 1988). In 1985, the Congress of South African Unions held its exuberant founding congress, with thousands of militant workers listening intently to speakers demanding political and social rights for all South Africans. Within five years, leading South African businessmen were negotiating secretly with the ANC in exile; less than ten years later, Mandela was elected president of a proud new democracy.

Labor and politics have long been deeply intertwined in South Africa, and 'social movement unionism' was central to the broader anti-apartheid struggles. Under apartheid, black workers were denied political rights; the laws that kept blacks from voting also excluded them from most unions, and from the legal collective bargaining system available to white workers. As South Africa industrialized, however, some employers began to negotiate with new non-racial unions outside that legal framework. By the late 1970s, anti-apartheid activists had come to view the country's factories and mines as key sites of protest; frequent strikes and stay-away simultaneously challenged private employers and the white-minority state. Nonracial unions coordinated their efforts with banned political parties, especially the African National Congress, and workplace actions often took on the chaotic, almost euphoric tenor that marks

social movements, bypassing legal channels and with a strong emphasis on mobilizing community support for popular demands.

South Africa was not unique, especially in the global South. Industrial workers in Brazil, South Korea, and the Philippines responded to authoritarian industrialization in similar style, as disenfranchised industrial workers disrupted factory production in support of broad demands for political inclusion (Koo, 2001; Scipes, 1996; Seidman, 1994). This 'social movement unionism'had little in common with the institutionalized patterns of collective bargaining familiar to European or North American labor scholars; its emergence in late-industrializing regions towards the end of the Cold War surprised most labor academics, who had generally assumed that in postcolonial settings, industrial workers would form a kind of 'labor aristocracy', distancing themselves from less-organized peasants or informal-sector workers. Instead, these newly-militant unions used factory-based actions to press both business elites and politicians for expanded citizenship rights – more T.H. Marshall (1950) than Selig Perlman (1928).

For labor scholars, this new militancy offered an enticing prospect at the start of the millennium. Especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consolidation of the WTO, as appeals to socialism began to sound faintly old-fashioned, 'social movement unionism' seemed to hold out new promise for a different kind of labor movement, with an emphasis on broad recruitment and community mobilization, stressing inclusiveness, offering an exciting alternative to bureaucratized national industrial relations systems (Chun, 2009; cfLuce, 2014: 153). As Fantasia and Voss (2004) put it, 'The vision of labor evoked by social movement unionism is entirely different than the one conjured up by business unionism: unions are seen as dealing with questions of social justice that extend well beyond the unionized work force, rather than advocating only for a narrow interest group.'

But while labor scholars around the world continued to suggest that South Africa's labor movement still stands as a model of working-class militancy, the labor movement itself faces what is clearly its most serious crisis since the Congress of South African Trade Unions was launched thirty years ago. For nearly a decade, struggles over leadership, strategies, and political alliances have bubbled just under the surface. Many individual unions within COSATU have been in disarray, struggling to maintain membership, workplace strength, and organizational capacity.

Even before the Marikana massacre, South African union density overall was dropping precipitously. In 1997, nearly half the country's workforce claimed to belong to unions. By 2010, however, that figure had dropped to only 23.3 percent (Webseter, 2013). For most outsiders, however, the depths of the challenges facing COSATU first burst into view in August 2012, when 34 striking mineworkers were killed at Marikana, platinum mine in South Africa's North West Province. South African police shot live ammunition at crowds of miners leaving a rally. The film footage of the massacre shocked audiences around the world, but even now, two years later, the details of the episode remain murky, a heady mix of South Africa's historic legacies, internal divisions in the labor movement, and deep tensions within the ruling coalition.

Until 1999, the London-based multinational which owns the Marikana platinum mine, was known as Lonhro, a Rhodesian company long synonymous with Southern African colonialism. Like most major Southern African mining conglomerates, however, Lonhro–now renamed Lonmin, and headquartered in London, although its mineral holdings are almost entirely located in Southern Africa -- adapted quickly to post-apartheid reality, recognizing and negotiating with the National Union of Mineworkers, a union that has been central to COSATU, with a proud history in South Africa's anti-apartheid struggle.

In the general excitement over South Africa's almost-miraculous transition, even attentive labor observers probably underestimated the significance of a minor union conflict in 1998, when one of NUM's shop stewards split to form a break-off unions, charging that the more-established union had failed to improve conditions at South Africa's rapidly-expanding platinum mines for African workers -- most of whom, even today, are low-paid migrant workers living in squalid shacks on the veldt, in communities that lack basic services like electricity, water or schools(Dasnois, 2014; TIPS, 2014). Over the decade, the two unions competed for members in South Africa's rapidly-expanding platinum belt; an area holding nearly 90percent of the world's known platinum reserves.

In mid-2012, during a prolonged wild-cat strike, both unions accused each other of violent attacks; several deaths heightened tensions. .In mid-August, police arrived at a rally near the Marikana platinum mine carrying guns loaded with live ammunition. Under circumstances that remain unclear, police fired at striking mineworkers as they ran away from the meeting. Thirty-four miners were killed – in some cases, shot, execution-style, in the back of the head (Alexander et al, 2012). More than two years later, a government commission has not yet published its report. Lengthy testimony before the commission did not provide any clear explanation for why the police decided to use shoot the striking mineworkers, or why no government officials have been held accountable for the decision to use deadly force against striking workers.

The Marikana massacre and its aftermath marked a distinct turning point for the country, for the labor movement, and for the governing coalition. South Africans across the political spectrum – especially those sympathetic to labor – expressed outrage at the actions of police, who were operating under the control of a government that boasts of its formal alliance with organized labor. In an anguished *cri de coeur,* COSATU's widely-respected founding general secretary Jay Naidoo (2012) wrote,

> *Have we lost touch with our members? After all, these workers were seasoned unionists who have fought many battles, yet they consciously joined an alternative union. We will need some brutal self-assessment here… There is a deep-seated anger growing in the country. And yet the leaders are not at the coal face. People feel robbed of their voices and powerless.*

And, he insisted -- in a question aimed directly at his former comrades -- the massacre required labor unions to ask 'why so many mineworkers chose a different union and why they lost confidence in a COSATU affiliate.'

Almost exactly a year later, as the inquiry into the Marikana shootings was still dragging on, political tensions within the federation erupted into a second crisis. In August 2013, COSATU's elected governing committee suspended COSATU's current general secretary, ZwelinzimaVavi, over charges that he had sexually harassed a COSATU employee. A court later reversed the suspension on procedural grounds andVavi was returned to his position, but that months-long suspension laid bare deep divisions within the labor movement.

Whatever the truth of the charges against Vavi– or of other charges swirling around corruption and real estate deals -- many labor activists believed that Vavi was suspended over political disagreements within COSATU's leadership. Most of COSATU's elected leaders remained loyal to the ruling ANC coalition. As the federation's appointed general secretary, however, Vavi had grown increasingly insistent that organized labor should serve as an independent voice for workers.

The general secretary's shift to what in South Africa is considered a more 'workerist' stance came as something of a surprise. COSATU's individual unions have long cultivated slightly different political tendencies, with some unions, like the National Union of Mineworkers, generally loyal to the ANC, while others, like the National Union of Metalworkers, urging the federation to maintain political independence as a working-class organization. Throughout South Africa's young democracy, however, COSATU has consistently endorsed the ANC in elections, and the federation has been a staunch partner for the ANC and the South African Communist Party in government. In 2009, as general secretary, Vavi was instrumental in

bringing labor to back Jacob Zuma's presidential candidacy, believing Zuma would push the ANC toward a more populist approach. Four years into Zuma's presidency, Vavi became increasingly insistent: if labor's longstanding political allies failed to fulfill their promises, he warned, COSATU should move away from the ruling coalition, to become a more independent voice for South Africa's working class–a surprising stance for someone who had long been a member of both the ANC and the Communist Party.

In the context of these disagreements, Vavi's suspension was bound to be interpreted as political payback, and considered a harbinger of further conflict. Even after a court returned him to his post, several large unions -- led by the workerist-leaning National Union of Metalworkers (NUMSA), one of the federation's largest affiliates -- continued to discuss the possibility of creating a new, politically-independent coalition of unions and community activists, which would be officially independent of the ANC. Apparently as a result of those discussions, COSATU's executive committee expelled the Metalworkers in late 2014. In a confusing sequence of events, NUMSA announced it would contest the expulsion, but plans to form a new 'united front' for South Africa's working class continued. Then, even as NUMSA continued to try to stay within COSATU, seven other unions announced they would follow NUMSA out of the federation, to form a rival labor grouping.

Almost inevitably, the details of the split will drag on: the division of resources between unions, like the delineation of members and bargaining units, will almost certainly end up in court, and the dust may not settle for several years. But as the unions struggle over how to resolve their organizational confusion, the underlying political conflict seems clear. Some union leaders remained committed to labor's longstanding alliance with the ANC and the South African Communist Party. Others, led by the Metalworkers' Union -- long a hotbed of 'workerist' sympathies– hope to build a fledgling coalition of labor groups and community

activists, which they believe would allow South Africa's working class to challenge labor's erstwhile political allies.

The future of both the ANC-led coalition and the fledgling United Front remains unclear.

Like most conflicts, labor's most bitter disagreements are driven by personalities and political allegiances, even more than organizational dynamics or strategic differences. But most South African activists acknowledge that labor's current crisis stems from much deeper, often unspoken, tensions. As Jay Naidoo (2012) insisted after Marikana, labor's real challenges lie in the stark inequalities that mark South African society:

> *There is growing ferment in our land. The people in our townships, rural areas and squatter camps are bitter that democracy has not delivered the fruits that they see a tiny elite enjoying. Our leaders across the spectrum are not talking to our people, they are not working with them systematically to solve their problems, in providing the hope that one day, even in their children's lives, things will be better. All they see is the obscenity of shocking wealth and the chasm of inequality growing. The platinum mines they toil in, for a pittance, yield a precious metal that makes exorbitant jewelry that adorns the necks of the affluent and catalytic converters for the expensive cars the middle classes drive. The workers live in hovels, in informal squatter camps, surrounded by poverty and without basic services. All they experience is a political arrogance of leaders who more often than not enrich themselves at the expense the people. They are angry.*

As Naidoo argued, the legacies of apartheid continue to shape the lives of South African workers, and that reality consistently complicates labor's strategic options..

For twenty years, South African labor activists have supported a nationalist coalition that came to power promising deep-seated social change. Yet South Africa remains one of the world's most unequal societies; in fact, some analysts suggest South African incomes may be even more unequal today than they were twenty years ago. In 2010, the poorest 40 percent of South Africans received only 6.5 percent of the country's total income (Gelb, 2010); wealth is even more unequally distributed (Oxfam, 2014: 38).[2] True, South Africa's wealthy elite now includes some black faces, including well-known former labor leaders, but as Naidoo implies,

[2] In 2014, Oxfam reported that two individuals in South Africa held as much wealth as 26 million of their fellow South African citizens (Oxfam, 2014:38).

that change only begs the question: given labor's centrality to the ruling coalition, why are so many South Africans' lives still shaped by the entrenched inequalities that defined apartheid?

Union leaders and social mobility

Critics frequently attribute post-apartheid South Africa's policy choices to neoliberal globalization, and to political leaders who focused more on nationalist goals than on redistribution, pursuing policies that benefited white business owners and a small, politically-connected black elite, rather than addressing the country's stark inequalities (Barchiessi, 2011; Therborn, 2014:9). In the 1990s, the ANC certainly disappointed many leftwing supporters: coming to power just as the Cold War ended, at a time when the 'Washington consensus' dominated international policy discussions, the ANC pursued business-friendly policies. But that truth should not blind observers to the very real transformations in the relationship between the state and the country's black majority – especially, South Africa's concerted efforts to expand social programs and services to the poor since the early 2000s.

For at least a decade, post-apartheid South Africa has leaned populist as much as neoliberal, expanding a basic social safety net to include poor black households for the first time in the country's history – even while the country continues to be one of the most unequal in the world. South Africa has steadily expanded social services, providing housing, healthcare and education for previously-excluded households, and spending a significant portion of the government's budget on programs for the poor. In 2013, more than 16 million people in more than half of South Africa's households received some form of social grant (Bhorat and Cassim, 2014).Today, a majority of black households receive means-tested cash grants, linked to old age, child welfare, or disability. Though small, these cash transfers have become central to the survival of the country's poorest households: more than 70 percent of

the income of South Africa's poorest quintile came from non-contributory and means-tested financial transfers, up from only 15 percent in 1993 (South African Treasury, 2013: 84).

Yet the fact that the ANC has put more resources into redistributive social programs than its critics generally acknowledge raises another set of questions, perhaps more troubling for organized labor. If the ANC is not, in fact, simply a puppet of neoliberal international agencies and multinational corporations, why has organized labor generally been treated as the weakest partner in the ruling coalition? Why, given labor's presence in that coalition, have COSATU's militant activists been unable to turn the country toward an even more inclusive growth path, one that would not only offer handouts, but also begin to transform South Africa's stark inequalities?

.Within labor circles, critics often explain labor's acquiescence in terms of what is now a twenty-year pattern, where key labor leaders have gone from union posts into well-paid government positions, or into lucrative positions in the private sector. Certainly, many black South African activists joined the labor movement initially because no other avenues for political engagement were available; especially as employers began to negotiate with non-racial unions, workplace actions offered relatively protected space for activism, and talented political activists often moved into union work. As South Africa embarked on its drawn-out democratic transition in the early 1990s, the lines between labor activism and politics were blurry. Especially as the ANC strengthened its formal alliance with organized labor, however, unionists with 'workerist' sympathies began to worry. Across post-colonial Africa, nationalist parties had failed to fulfil their promises once they came to power; COSATU activists hoped that by insisting on a clear distinction, unions would remain independent, and avoid becoming an acquiescent transmission belt for government policies. As a result, the unbanning of the ANC thinned the ranks of COSATU's leadership, as prominent labor leaders moved into politics. By 1994, when the ANC asked many of the country's most visible

unionists to run for parliament or to serve in government ministries, it was clear that the labor movement would lose some of its most talented leaders -- a pattern which persists even today, as the 2014 electoral lists included a new cohort of former labor leaders-turned-politicians (Buhlungu, 2010; *Sowetan*, 2014).

However, less public attention was paid to another, less visible, pattern – one which may have had more significant consequences for labor. From the beginning of the democratic transition, some former labor activists moved into jobs in the private sector, encouraged by white business leaders who hoped to strengthen their ties to the incoming political elite. South Africa has long been marked by close ties between its mining and manufacturing companies and its ruling parties; many large companies energetically recruited new faces onto their boards and into their management. Who better, from this perspective, than a widely-respected labor leader – someone who already has the respect of the workforce, whose union is already linked to the new ruling coalition, and with whom the previous board of directors has already learned to negotiate?

Twenty years later, former labor activists are fixtures in South Africa's boardrooms. Indeed, one of the most visible of these unionists-turned-business-tycoons played a prominent and controversial role in the lead-up to the Marikana massacre. In August 2012, Cyril Ramaphosa, former mineworkers' leader and leading anti-apartheid figure, owned nearly ten percent of Lonmin, the platinum company which owns the Marikana mine. During the strike, Ramaphosa – who earned as much for serving as a non-executive director for Lonmin as five underground drillers earn in a year – sent an email to the Minister of Mineral Resources, blaming the splinter union for what he called 'dastardly criminal [acts which] must be

characterized as such.' (Alexander et al, 2012: 183; Smith, 2012). The massacre occurred the very next day, as police shot mine-workers as they ran across the veld.[3]

Fears that the movement of key labor leaders into politics and the private sector would undermine the movement's strategic capacity were almost certainly exaggerated, as new leaders soon emerged to replace those who had moved to the other side of the bargaining table. But at the level of the shop-floor, a less-visible parallel dynamic may have had more immediate consequences for unions' role within South Africa's mines and factories. In 2008, about half of COSATU members reported that in their own workplace, they had seen a union shop-steward promoted into management (Masondo, 2012: 118). Across the country, union shop stewards have been tapped for management positions, often joining the human relations department of the same enterprises where they previously served as union officers.

The upward mobility of shop stewards reflects the remarkable speed with which South African employers adapted to their new environment: even before the country's first democratic elections, most large employers realized they would have to recognize and negotiate with non-racial unions. Who better to help negotiate this new terrain than former labor activists? As former shop-stewards, they bring experience at the plant and with their fellow-workers; former shop-stewards are ideally positioned to help companies understand tensions and to improve shop-floor relations (Masondo, 2012: 121; Munusamy, 2012).

But these promotions may also cause tensions within unions. If ordinary workers believe that shop-stewards consider their union position a steppingstone into management, members may distrust the choices shop-stewards make on their members' behalf. In fact, this kind of distrust may help explain some of the internecine rivalries on the platinum belt before and after the

[3]Ramaphosa expressed deep regret over the police action; he left the Lonmin board soon after the shootings. In December 2013, the ANC's national conference elected him as a party leader, and in May 2014 he was appointed the country's deputy president, making him a likely future candidate for the presidency.

Marikana strike: the break-away union charged that fulltime NUM shop-stewards were working too closely with management, privileging relatively skilled workers, overlooking pay differentials and the squalid living conditions of less-skilled miners (Hartford, 2012).

Yet while leadership changes and tensions on the shop floor may complicate internal union discussions, they hardly explain the explosive conflicts that are tearing apart South Africa's once-unified labor movement. Understanding the challenges facing South Africa's labor movement today requires looking beyond the career paths of individual activists, to a much broader transformation in labor unions 'membership, and at how South Africa's democracy transformed organized labor's relationship to the democratic state, and to the country's poor communities.

COSATU's changing membership

While democratization opened new paths for individual union officials, it also led to dramatic changes in the character of South Africa's union membership – changes that seem central to labor's dilemmas today. First, and perhaps most importantly, union members are significantly more skilled and educated than they were during the heyday of the anti-apartheid struggle, a shift that reflects both new opportunities for black South Africans, and new openings in South African labor laws.

In 1994, roughly 60 percent of COSATU's members were considered 'unskilled' or 'semi-skilled'. In part, these figures reflect apartheid's racialized 'job reservation' laws, which excluding black workers from most skilled job titles. Skilled jobs were explicitly 'reserved' for white workers; black workers could only be hired for those job titles if the employer could prove no white workers were available[4] -- a rule meant to maintain racial hierarchies at at

[4]Of course, in reality, employers used this system to underpay their workers: many black workers performed skilled work, but because they were hired for jobs labelled semi-skilled or unskilled, they were paid less than their 'skilled' white counterparts.

work. Through the second half of the twentieth century, as more and more black workers were hired into its expanding factory and mines, job reservation blocked any hope of promotion or training within the factory for most workers. Not surprisingly, as South Africa's mines and factories expanded through the 1970s, unskilled and semiskilled black workers were at the heart of the militant labor movement, and central to labor's close alliance with poor communities.

After twenty years of democracy, however, COSATU's membership includes far more skilled workers. By 2008, according to one survey, only about six percent of union members worked in jobs labeled 'unskilled', and only 16 percent were 'semi-skilled' – compared to about 30 percent labeled 'unskilled', and 30 percent 'semi-skilled', in 1994 . Further, many more skilled, supervisory, or professional workers have joined the unions: the percentage of COSATU's members in these categories rose from roughly 25 percent in 1994 to a whopping 66.4 percent in 2008.

Moreover, COSATU members today boast much higher levels of formal education than they did in the federation's earlier days – again, a reflection of the new opportunities that have opened for black South Africans, and of the country's new labor laws. In 1994, only about 34 percent of COSATU members had finished high school; by 2008, that figure had reached 74 percent, while more than 30 percent have some kind of tertiary qualification (Bischoff and MalehokoTshoaedi, 2012: 50-52).

This dramatic transformation reflects changes both in South Africa's civil service, and in its labor laws. At COSATU's launch, only about four percent of its members were in public sector employment; by 2012, that figure had soared to about 42 percent of COSATU's two million members (di Paola and Duca, 2012; Pickard, 2006). Today, the National Education, Health and Allied Workers' Union (NEHAWU), with 265,000 members, and the South African Municipal Workers' Union (SAMWU), with 150,000 members, are respectively

South Africa's third and the fourth largest unions. If the metal-workers' union, one of COSATU's largest private-sector affiliates, does in fact leave the federation as threatened, public sector unions will make up more than half of the federation's members. Two decades of transformation in South Africa' public sector have created new channels for upward mobility for educated black South Africans – much as the expansion of the apartheid-era public sector in the 1950s once offered new opportunities for Afrikaans-speaking whites. Today, South Africa's teachers, nurses and other public sector professionals are generally seen as the core of South Africa's growing black middle class (Selzer and Heller, 2010).

But this transformation in unionists' education levels does not mean that South Africa's labor movement is now a middle class movement. In education, as in most aspects of South African life, apartheid's legacies still shape the present: some 60 percent of young adults, mostly raised in rural or poor households, have not graduated from high school. So, even today, African public sector workers are more likely to be cleaners, janitors, or hospital assistants than doctors or teachers. Indeed, nearly half the members of SAMWU, the militant municipal workers' union, are internal migrants, most with less than five or six years of education (Xulu, Bulungu and Tshoaedi, 2012: 218-220) – precisely the kind of less-skilled African workers whose lives were shaped by apartheid's racial geography and the migrant labor system.[5]

There is a great deal of evidence that the educated nurses and teachers who belong to public sector unions defer to less-skilled, lower-paid colleagues in shaping their unions' agendas. In the health sector, for example, Von Holdt (2003) found that union activists tend to defer to the concerns of less-well-paid members – although Von Holdt also found that strict hierarchies at work lead to different tactical preferences, with skilled health care

[5] Under apartheid, many municipalities built single-sex hostels, hiring internal migrants whose families remained in former Bantustans, depending on remittances sent back by the migrant worker. Although all those single-sex hostels have been transformed since 1994 into multi-family units, many workers 'families have chosen to stay in the countryside; it is certainly possible that when they take on new workers, these municipal authorities draw on existing workers' networks, bringing new migrant workers into their ranks.

professionals preferring collective bargaining, while less-skilled workers turning more readily to militant strikes. South Africa's public sector union members tend to be strong ANC supporters; in surveys they consistently express more willingness than their private sector counterparts to engage in 'mass action' -- perhaps reflecting public sector workers' deep involvement with public policy (Mosoetsa, 2012: 158).

But while public sector workers' skill levels may not prevent their unions from maintaining a militant stance, the job security enjoyed by union members who are civil servants is part of a second critical way in which the character of organized labor has been transformed by democracy. Historically, all black South African workers knew they were vulnerable to retaliation or repression: South Africa's racialized labor processes meant that no black worker, however skilled, could look to the state or to employers for guarantees of labor rights. Democracy brought new labor laws, and with them, the promise that all citizens would enjoy workplace protections that had long been denied.

Today, however, that promise remains only partially fulfilled: union members are far more likely to enjoy job security than most South African workers. In 2012, although a COSATU survey reported that about 92 percent of its members enjoyed permanent contracts, only about half of non-member respondents said they had permanent contracts -- in a sample that did not even attempt to include people who worked in micro-enterprises or the informal sector (COSATU 2012a).

Of course, vulnerability is hardly new. But while precariousness and insecurity have long marked most South African workers' experiences, vulnerability may be more meaningful today, especially given high unemployment levels. Although analysts debate the statistical level of casual employment – and although many sub-contracted workers are, in fact, legally protected from retaliation – vulnerability still marks employment relations for most workers. Indeed, one study found that nearly two-thirds of the new jobs created in post-apartheid

South Africa -- roughly 2.3 million of 3.4 new jobs -- were categorized as 'Financial and Business Services' and 'Whole-sale and Retail Trade', two categories which include sub-contracted workers as well as street vending and informal work (Bhorat and Westhuizen, 2013: 2). South Africa's unskilled and inexperienced workers, mostly African, struggle to find permanent jobs, a fact exacerbated by unemployment rate that consistently hover around 25 percent nationally.

Further, a democratic South Africa began to extend new labor protections to all its citizens, the impact of these new labor laws was limited by managerial strategies that reduced employers' contractual obligations. From the late 1980s, as South Africa's business elite began to consider a transition from apartheid inevitable, major employers began to mechanize, hoping to reduce their reliance on low-paid workers. In mining and commercial agriculture – both sectors which historically relied heavily on low-paid African workers – managers have invested in labor-reducing technologies: over the past 15 years, mining and commercial agriculture have shed 74,000 jobs, cutting their total share of employment by ten percent despite relatively steady growth rates in both sectors (Bhorat and Westhuizen, 2013).Mining remains the country's leading sector, and output has remained steady, but since about 1990, South Africa's mining companies have explicitly sought to reduce their dependence on the large armies of unskilled migrant workers that were the hallmark of apartheid's racialized, hierarchical labor processes (Kenny and Bezuidenhout, 1999;Seidman, 1997; Webster et al, 2008).Similarly, in South Africa's commercial agricultural sector. about 45,000 commercial farmers, mostly white, farm about 86 percent of the country's agricultural land; about two million other farmers, mostly black, scratch out a living on the remaining 14 percent of agricultural land. Much as mining companies responded to democratization by reducing reliance on unskilled workers, many commercial farms have moved to more mechanized, less labor-intensive processes – often evicting families who had been tenant

farmers or farm laborers in the process (Boehm and Schirmer, 2010; Bannerjee et al, 2007;Cousins, 2011: 98; Makgetla, 2011: 11).

Both leftwing and business critics often point to this divide as evidence that unions represent relatively well-paid, relatively secure workers, who use their organizational strength to demand higher wages for themselves, ignoring the impact on their less-well-paid, less-secure fellow citizens (Barchiesi, 2011; Nattrass and Seekings, 2013; Sharpe, 2014). But it is almost certainly wrong to assume that workers in permanent positions in the formal sector see their interests as distinct from those of more vulnerable workers, or from those who depend on social grants for survival. Indeed, as Ben Scully notes (2014), many South African households depend on combining income from many sources -- from wages or remittances, social grants, and informal or casual labor. Throughout the democratic era, labor leaders have consistently supported programs aimed at benefiting those outside the formal sector, recognizing that the lines between the formal and informal sector are blurry indeed.

Nevertheless, widespread precariousness outside the unionized core may complicate unions' tactical choices, if not labor's long-term goals. Under apartheid, militant mass actions were the hallmark of COSATU's 'social movement unionism': union militants counted on support from black townships, while workplace action often included broad community in their demands.

Social movements, as Chuck Tilly (1993) reminded us, tend to draw on existing repertoires of action, going back to strategies and tactics that have worked before even when the context around them changes – and labor unions are perhaps particularly prone to using tactics that have worked before. South African union organizers often define their unions' strength in terms of their ability to call militant strikes; but the kind of militant strikes that garnered so much community support during the anti-apartheid movement's heyday may be more problematic today. There is some evidence that vulnerable workers fear being asked to join

militant strikes, reducing their willingness to join unions. In industries marked by casual and low-skilled employment – industries as different as mining, domestic work, and the private security sector --South African workers have told researchers they are unwilling to join unions, because they believe that membership in a union would inevitably mean they would have to participate in a strike – a move that these respondents say they fear, because although they understood they have real rights under South Africa's labor laws, they have little expectation that either the union or the government could protect them if an employer were to retaliate. Thus, they say, they are reluctant to join unions; indeed, several workers told researchers they had instead chosen to purchase private legal insurance, so that they could count on having trained labor lawyers to represent them in South Africa's new labor courts if they were, in fact, fired (Ally, 2009; Buhlungu and Bezedenhuit,2008).

For some workers, apparently, union shop-stewards are seen more as potential strike-leaders than as potential representatives in a grievance procedure – an ironic contrast to unionists in the United States, who sometimes seem more experienced in handling grievances than mobilizing demonstrations of workplace power (Clawson, 2003). But it also underscores the possibility that unions' continued reliance on calling militant strikes during wage negotiations – a tactic that worked so well twenty years ago -- may undermine labor's ability to bring new recruits into the union fold. Even some of COSATU's leftwing critics have acknowledged this problem: Barchiesi(2011: 240), for example, reports that he interviewed many workers who have become 'cynical and disillusioned toward activism and apathetic toward participation in union activities, preferring a 'business unionism' focused on concrete deliverables' to the kind of militant strikes that defined South Africa's labor movement in the past.

Institutional pressures

In the context of heightened casualization and precariousness, labor activists around the world have urged governments 'bring the state back in' to strengthen workplace protections

(Luce et al 2014) -- an approach that needs little justification in South Africa, given the state's historical centrality in shaping workplace dynamics. Yet labor strategies are still shaped by a repertoire of contention that emphasizes strikes over negotiations and privileges workplace disruption over efforts to engage in broad policy debates. This focus on shop-floor agendas may have been reinforced, however, by institutional choices made during the transition to democracy..Built on inherited institutional arrangements, post-apartheid South Africa's industrial relations system may push unionists to focus more on the needs of workers in specific industries, inadvertently widening the gap between represented and precarious workers.

The history of South Africa's sectoral bargaining council framework is instructive. Under apartheid, South Africa's industrial conciliation system was designed to separate unionized workers from the rest of the workforce, along lines both of race and skill level. From the late 1920s to the end of apartheid, white workers' unions were brought in as partners in a racialized corporatism. All-white unions were welcome to participate in industry-based negotiations with government and employer representatives, setting basic wage and working conditions for the entire sector. But black workers, of course, were excluded – a fact that ensured that as non-racial unions emerged in the 1970s, most roundly rejected the entire system.

During South Africa's prolonged negotiations in the early 1990s, however, leading unionists began to look anew at the council system, hoping that these forums might offer organized labor an independent voice in the country's nascent democracy. Fueled by the same distrust of 'bourgeois nationalism' that prompted the 'two-hat' policy barring political candidates from retaining their union positions, key union leaders -- including many in the National Union of Metalworkers – believed the council system might provide a space where organized labor could speak to politicians on an equal footing, instead of as junior partners in a coalition. The

inherited system of industry-based bargaining councils, they hoped, would allow unions to build on their strength. Unions that had already built a cohesive workplace presence would use their position in council negotiations to demand improved conditions for their members, and then across their industries. From there, labor could push government and employers to extend workers' rights in other sectors, without having to make unacceptable political compromises (Webster, 2013).

Even before labor's current crisis, most labor analysts were willing to acknowledge that this expectation has not been realized. The sectoral system remains patchy and uneven, today covering only about 2.4 million of South Africa's 10.2 million formal sector workers. Most workers whose industries were excluded from the original council system still lack representation in formal bargaining processes – especially those workers, mostly black, who remain concentrated in sectors which have historically depended on the availability of a large supply of low-skilled workers. South Africa's most vulnerable workers -- farm workers, domestic workers, and the workers lumped together under the catchall 'informal' category – remain almost entirely unrepresented in the industrial council framework, even today.

That patchy system has greatly complicated efforts to extend and enforce new labor rights for most workers. In part, this reflects the sectoral bargaining structure's institutional design, and the limited sectoral corporatism of the previous regime: the entire system tends to focus attention on already-covered workers rather than pushing even well-intentioned policy-makers to reach out to protect those outside the framework For example, each sectoral council negotiates a distinct minimum wage level, applicable only to workers in that industry. Enforcement of minimum wage levels, then, is divided between different levels, different bargaining councils, and national and provincial-level labor departments, creating a maze of overlapping inspectorates. In 2003, recognizing that many workers, mostly black and poor, were not covered by any bargaining council, and so were not protected by any minimum wage

at all. The government adopted new laws setting national minimum wages for workers in agriculture, domestic work, and private security work – all sectors where many African workers are employed, but where unions have made relatively little headway.

For the millions of South Africans working outside covered sectors, or who are hired through casual employment, the sectoral approach has offered little protection, and little help in strengthening workplace bargaining power. Again, efforts to create and enforce minimum wage levels are instructive. In 2014, about 3.5 million workers were covered by sectoral determinations, but new wage rules were not linked to stronger enforcement. Together with the 2.4 million workers protected by bargaining council agreements, the new national 'sectoral determinations' still meant that in 2014, fewer two-thirds of South Africa's formal sector workers could point to a legal floor under their wages (Coleman, 2014). .Even workers covered under minimum wage laws could not that employers would actually comply, and they seem to have little recourse when they are underpaid: A 2011 study found that 44 percent of all covered workers are paid less than the legislated legal minimum for their sector – and, even worse, that the 'average depth of shortfall' is 35 percent of the minimum wage (Bhorat, Kanbur and Mayet, 2011: 4).

Even before the Marikana massacre, COSATU's executive officers had begun suggest reforms, calling for a single national minimum wage (COSATU 2012) along lines that have been standard in most industrialized countries since the mid-twentieth century (Beber and Sobeck, 2012).Despite vocal opposition from observers who fear that a minimum wage might increase already-high unemployment, and despite ongoing debates over how high a new national minimum wage might be set, the government appears to be sympathetic to a the proposal(Boehm and Schirmer, 2010; Leibrandt et al, n.d.; Mbatha, 2014;Nattrass and Seekings 2013). As long as organized labor remains focused on its internecine conflicts, however, questions of institutional design seem likely to remain unaddressed.

Tensions of democracy

But what of the poor communities which supported 'social movement unionism' during the anti-apartheid era. How have democracy and a transformed union structure affected relationships between organized workers and the poor communities in which they live? Even more than changes in union membership or in the institutions of collective bargaining, South Africa's fledgling democracy presents unions with new challenges: today, labor rights and citizenship rights sometimes push unions in very different strategic directions.

In the past two decades, perhaps South Africa's proudest accomplishment has been the government's concerted effort to extend public services – water, electricity, clinics, and housing -- to black townships and to rural villages, to areas long neglected under apartheid. But there is still enormous need. In the context of stark inequality, inadequate public services serve as a visible reminder that apartheid's legacies still shape South Africans' daily lives, and remain a key grievance.

As a result, community protests over inadequate or unequal services have become a persistent feature of South African politics today, especially in poor peri-urban areas marked by informal housing, high unemployment, and inadequate infrastructure. Long-standing community frustrations combine with localized conflicts over government spending, and, often, with local struggles between political networks competing for control over budgetary decisions -- exacerbated, perhaps, by a shift to a system of decentralized government administration during the negotiated transition – have led to a new pattern of protest. Across the country, small groups of protestors, usually in poor communities, erupt into small-scale, often chaotic 'service delivery protests', generally focused on 'local administrative targets, from municipal offices, public libraries, even post-offices.' (Hart, 2014:149) In 2014 alone, South Africa was said to have experienced an average of four to five service-delivery protests

per day; Gauteng, the area around Johannesburg, experienced 500 such protests only in the first two months of the year (Cronje, 2014).

Labor's role in 'service delivery' protests differs noticeably from the close involvement in community protests that marked South Africa's 'social movement unionism'. Under apartheid, community leaders generally viewed workplace activism as part of a much broader political struggle: South Africa's public resources had long been focused on whites-only areas, and the fact that country's black majority was excluded from enjoying their resources fueled both labor and community protests. Most unionists viewed workplace campaigns as off-shoots of community struggles, and often coordinated strikes with community groups and underground ANC networks -- a pattern that became even more marked during the late 1980s, when unions and political activists cooperated to create a climate of 'ungovernability.'

Today, many labor activists express deep sympathy with community frustration: despite significant improvements in water, electricity and roads over the past twenty years, most poor black communities remain under-served, and the disparities between relatively stable middle-class areas and the sprawling squatter settlements that surround most large towns and cities are hard to miss. But how should militant labor unions respond to 'service delivery protests' today – especially, when some of the most militant unions represent the very public sector workers responsible for providing public services, and when their workplace actions may disrupt the already-inadequate services on which so many households depend?

While union leaders stress their concern for the country's poor, and many union members live in communities still lacking basic amenities, workplace actions are far less likely to take up community issues than they did twenty years ago. Of course these issues remain closely linked, for union members as well as community residents; as South Africa's Minister of Labour noted recently, militant strikes reflect not only workers' anger over an increasing wage gap between management and workers and poverty, but also a broad awareness of a

'lack of real transformation, socioeconomic equity, mutual respect and trust in the workplace' (Odendaal, 2014). Nevertheless, over the past two decades, as negotiations between unions and employers have been legalized and institutionalized, most strike demands prioritize workplace issues like wages, contracts, and working conditions; community-based demands tend to be downplayed. Even in the platinum belt, where living conditions have been a core grievance of low-paid mineworkers, striking mineworkers' unions put wage increases as their top concern – a demand that promises relief for low-paid workers and their houses, but leaving community needs unmet.

This pattern is hardly surprising, of course. Almost by definition, workplace actions focus on employers and wages are central to labor negotiations. Similarly, in democratic societies, community protests are much more likely to focus their complaints on the state, and on the failure of political institutions to provide basic services -- demanding what T.H. Marshall describes as social citizenship.

In the context of South Africa's stark inequalities, and given the longstanding tradition of community-based labor militancy, however, South Africa's community protests raise a strategic challenge that is rarely discussed publicly by union activists. As public sector workers make up an ever-growing segment of union membership – and include many of labor's most militant activists – how should unions balance the concerns of their members, with those of the communities they claim to serve?

Perhaps because they enjoy reliable job security, public sector workers who are surveyed generally express even more militant views than their private-sector comrades -- a pattern that has had real consequences for their unions' strategic decisions. Throughout the past decade, public sector unions have been responsible for the vast majority of person-days lost to strikes in South Africa. During public-sector contract negotiations in 2007 and 2010, massive public sector strikes produced dramatic spikes in person-days lost: nearly ten million days lost in

2007 and nearly 21 million days lost in 2010. By contrast, South Africa lost only about a half a million person days to strikes in 2008 , and 1.5 million in 2009 – both years when only private-sector workers were involved in wage disputes (South African Department of Labour, 2011).

Public sector unions 'militancy raises a difficult conundrum for labor unions. As in much of the world, public services in South Africa are overcrowded and underserviced – prompting wealthy South Africans of all races to turn to private hospitals and gated communities. Poor communities, however, have little choice but to depend on public schools, public hospitals, and public infrastructure. When public sector workers-- bus drivers, nurses, school teachers -- go on strike, their work-stoppage risking making life even more difficult for the residents of South Africa's townships and squatter camp, for the people most affected by unemployment, poverty, and exclusion Although labor activists rarely acknowledge it, they know that public sector strikes inevitably will disrupt the lives of residents in the same poor black communities whose support was vital to the 'social movement unionism' of the anti-apartheid era.

These tensions over how strategic decisions will affect poor communities are rarely discussed in the context of the labor movement's current turmoil, but they clearly affect public perspectives on labor militancy. In October 2013, for example, the Anglican Church of Southern Africa (2013) -- a denomination long recognized for its commitment to social justice in the region – took the unusual step of calling on congregants who were members of the South African teachers union 'either to transform the trade union into a body that truly serves the cause of education, or resign from SADTU.' Further, the church called on the union to 'refrain from destructive stay-away', and even asked Parliament to declare teaching an essential service – a move that would have made most teachers' strikes illegal. Caught between those for whom strikes remain a marker of labor militancy, and those concerned about community needs, even usually-vocal unionists remain silent, preferring not to draw

attention to the problem. But as with other strategic issues faced by the labor movement, long-standing assumptions about unions' bonds with poor communities may have misled local activists to overlook the way labor's continued dependence on old tactics may blind unionists to the changing demands of a different context, and risk undermining public support.

Conclusion

As the apartheid regime collapsed, South Africa's labor movement offered a model of militant unionism that caught the attention of labor activists and scholars around the world: a movement united in the face of harsh repression, mobilizing workers and their communities to demand both political and labor rights. Today, that movement is in turmoil. But rather than attributing the turmoil simply to international forces or betrayal by political leaders, outside observers should also consider the way democracy itself changed the terrain on which union activists organized, and raised new challenges. Twenty years ago, few would have predicted the transformation that has occurred, either in union membership or in the strategic challenges that their organizations face. Democracy has created many new opportunities for South African unions, but it has also presented labor with strategic challenges that would have been unimaginable under apartheid.

As the dust settles, perhaps it will be possible for labor activists to ask questions that reflect labor's current dilemmas, not its past. What new tactics might be appropriate for unions' changing composition? What new institutions or enforcement strategies might strengthen labor protection for workers outside existing unions -- especially in the context of high inequality and unemployment? What could labor and government do to extend workplace protections to the millions of workers who remain outside the organized formal sector?

'Social movement unionism' describes a moment, not a strategy; its militant strikes may have challenged apartheid, but as a concept, it offers little guidance for how best to approach the

tactical questions around institutional design – challenges that unions in much of the world face today. In the context of changing production processes and mobile capital, what kind of organizational strategies will help recruit less-skilled workers? How can unions strengthen labor rights to reduce workers' persistent vulnerability? What kinds of bargaining institutions will promote inclusiveness, or push organized labor to reach out to workers beyond their membership? Even more than the current crisis, how South African labor activists respond to questions like these will be critical for their movement's long-term survival.

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IMPORTATION OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS UNDER THE BULK PROCUREMENT SYSTEM: BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES

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Disclaimer

The contents of this paper are the opinions of the author and not that of Petroleum Importation Coordinator (PICL) and should not in any way be associated by PICL.

INTRODUCTION

The Tanzania downstream petroleum industry was liberalized for a period of 12 years from 2000 to 2012 when the Bulk Procurement System started to operate. Effective from January 2000, petroleum downstream sub-sector was liberalized enabling Oil Marketing Companies (OMCs) to individually procure and trade petroleum products in accordance to their market requirements and setting pump prices based on the prevailing market forces.[6] As part of structural reforms, liberalization allowed all Oil Marketing Companies (OMCs) to purchase petroleum products from international commodity markets, principally, increasing competition between OMCs. Liberalization of petroleum industry despite having brought some benefit to the industry, it has also brought many problems in downstream subsector including among others, under declaration of imported volumes (which resulted in poor collections of government revenue), spiking of the prices, adulteration practices (blending of products attracting low taxes with those taxed highly such as blending Petrol/Diesel with Kerosene) and dumping of untaxed transit products in the domestic market by dishonest dealers.

The main objective of the petroleum bulk procurement system is to establish a petroleum supply system in which all players are assured of security of supply at the most competitive process possible, by purchasing from a pool of imports obtained from suppliers selected through a competitive bidding process to take advantage of economies of scale. The system is designed to maximize utilization of the assets along the supply chain to accommodate growing demand for the petroleum products in the country and the region at a minimum cost.

[6] http://www.ewura.go.tz/newsite/index.php/2012-03-09-08-22-52/petroleum

LEGAL FRAME WORK

The legal framework relevant to the importation of petroleum products is derived from, among others, the following legal instruments, the National Energy Policy of 2003, The Petroleum Act, CAP 392, The Petroleum Regulations, 2010, Petroleum (Bulk Procurement) Regulations, 2013, The Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority act CAP 414, Tanzania Bureau of Standards Specifications, Weights and measure Act and Customs Laws.

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

In Tanzania, the implementation of the Petroleum Bulk Procurement System (BPS) involves the following key players:

- The Ministry of Energy and Minerals;
- Energy and Water Regulatory Authority (EWURA);
- Tanzania Ports Authority (TPA);
- Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA),
- Tanzania Bureau of standards (TBS),
- Weights and Measure Agency (WMA),
- Petroleum Importation Coordinator Ltd (PICL),
- Oil Marketing Companies (OMCs), suppliers,
- Banks and Financial Institutions
- Surveyors.

The ministry has a role of formulating policies for upstream and downstream petroleum subsector. Petroleum Importation Coordinator Ltd is responsible in coordinating importation of petroleum products under the Bulk Procurement System.

PETROLEUM IMPORTATION COORDINATOR LTD

The Petroleum (Bulk Procurement) Regulations of 2011 required all petroleum wholesalers to establish the petroleum importation coordinator which shall be a company limited by guarantee with no share capital to coordinate bulk procurement of petroleum products. The shareholders of petroleum importation Coordinator Ltd are OMCs making it a private company.

The current operations of PICL are guided by;

- Petroleum (Bulk Procurement) Regulations of 2013 GN. No. 59 of 2013;
- The Bulk Procurement System Manual;
- Supply, Shipping Contract between PICL and the Supplier and
- The shipping and supply agreement between PICL and individual OMCs.

The Petroleum Importation Coordinator Ltd as a coordinator has the responsibility for the administration of importation and supply of petroleum products in the country.

PICL commenced its operations at the beginning of year 2012. To date PICL has been able to successful coordinate importation of petroleum product under 34 Tenders.

IMPORTATION OF BULK PETROLEUM PRODUCTS

All petroleum products to be used in the country are supposed to be imported through the bulk procurement system. However for the transit products it is optional[7]. The Bulk procurement System is applicable to the following petroleum products;

- Premium Motor Spirit; (PMS)
- Automotive Gasoil, (AGO)
- Illuminating Kerosene, (IK)
- JET – A1,
- Heavy fuel oil (HFO) and
- Liquefied Petroleum Gas.[8] (LPG)

COORDINATION OF IMPORTATION OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS UNDER THE BULK PROCUREMENT SYSTEM

Coordination of importation of petroleum products involves a number of actives such are, prequalification of the suppliers, collecting monthly requirements from OMCs, floating a tender and awarding the contract, coordinating receiving of imported petroleum products, and managing contractual performance of all parties under the contract.

[7] G.N No. 59 0F 2013

[8] G.N No. 59 0F 2013

1. **Responsibilities of PICL under the Bulk Procurement System**

PICL is mandated to;

- Collect the procurement requirements of petroleum product in respect of its members;
- Conclude and administer contracts by PICL and a supplier and between PICL and OMCs;
- Conduct international competitive bidding for the procurement of petroleum products in bulk,
- Forecast supply and demand of petroleum products ,
- Coordinate diligent receipt by OMCs of petroleum products from the delivery vessels,
- Maintain records of the shipments and performance ,
- Coordinate invoicing and payments for the respective shares of petroleum products by OMCs

2. **Prequalification of Suppliers**

It is only prequalified suppliers who are allowed to participate in BPS tenders. Prequalification of the suppliers is done twice every year and the prequalified suppliers are eligible to participate in BPS tender till 31st December of the specific year. The expression of interest for prequalification of suppliers to supply petroleum products under the Bulk procurement system is internationally advertised.

3. **Collecting requirements from OMCs.**

The OMCs are required to submit their monthly requirements to PICL; PICL consolidates the received orders and float a tender.

4. **Floating Monthly Tenders for the Procurement of Petroleum Products**

Tenders for the petroleum products under the bulk procurement system are floated on a monthly basis. The tenders are opened in public and at the presence of all bidders. The tender requires bidders to quote Delivered at Place DAP Dar es Salaam Port premiums. The cost of the product is Platts average of the month before the month of delivery. (M-1). PICL takes the premium as at the time of the tender PICL do not know the cost of the product for the months of delivery at the world market (Platt). As purchasers are supposed to open Letter

of credits or to make cash payments at least five days before the vessel delivery range, the invoices are based on the FOB prices of the month before the month of delivery and thereafter debit/credit notes are raised based on the difference. The bidders are competing on premiums only; the purchasers are paying for the product based on the FOB cost plus DAP premium.

All bids are evaluated against pre-greed criteria specified in the bid documents. The tender is awarded to the lowest premium of evaluated bidder. The letter of award is issued on the same day and the winner is supposed to submit a performance bond within 9 days from the date the letter of award is issued. After submitting the performance bond then the contract will be signed as the performance bond is a precondition to the contract

5. Delivering petroleum products under the bulk procurement system

Petroleum products imported under the Bulk Procurement System are supposed to be delivered within the specified and agreed delivery date range called Laycan (being a window of five days allocated by TPA and PICL for the vessel to berth). The contract between the supplier and PICL is strict on Laycan as when a vessel arrives and it cannot berth within the days allocated the OMCs pays demurrage at an average of USD 20,000.00 per day which will be worked out the MT or per Litre. On the other hand if the vessel arrives outside the Laycan then no demurrage is payable and if it's more than seven (7) days then the OMCs can cancel the order. As contractual requirement both the supplier and PICL are supposed to make sure that the product has been tested and is within the approved specifications as per the requirements of Tanzania Bureau of Standards. Testing of the product is done on two aspects quantity and quality. This is done before the product is discharged into receiving terminals by a surveyor mutually agreed upon by the supplier and PICL and the cost shared between the two.

PRICING OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN TANZANIA

EWURA is responsible in setting prices for the petroleum products in Tanzania. The power of determining the price is vested to EWURA by rule 4 (1) of Petroleum Products Price Setting Rules of 2009 and section 40(1) (c), (d) and (j) of EWURA Act. The pricing formula has four major cost elements; importation cost (weighted average Platts and premium) actual landing costs DAP DAR, Local cost payable to other Authorities, government tax, OMCs margins (retail and wholesale) and local transport cost. When setting pieces of petroleum products

EWURA gets some information from PICL. Information obtained from PICL is actual product landing cost, demurrage cost, and premium. Any change on product landing cost, demurrage and premium will have impact on the pump price. Below is CAP price as of effect Wednesday 6 May 2015.

CAP PRICES WEF WEDNESDAY 6 May 2015

	Weighted Average of Actual Exchange Rates of the Previous Month (M-1):			**Exchange Rate**	**1,876.25**
	WT Average Actual Conversion Factors of the Previous Month (M-1):		**0.7616**	**0.8301**	**0.7905**
			Petrol	**Diesel**	**Kerosene**
	DESCRIPTION	**UNIT**	**PRICE**	**PRICE**	**PRICE**
	Weighted Average Platt's FOB	Tzs/Ltr	838.72	811.49	790.68
Plus	Weighted Average Premium as Per Quotation (Freight+Insurance+Premium)	Tzs/Ltr	84.98	64.83	72.32
Sub Total	**COST CIF DAR**	**Tzs/Ltr**	**923.69**	**876.32**	**862.99**
	LOCAL COSTS PAYABLE TO OTHER AUTHORITIES				
	Wharfage $10/MT + 18% VAT	Tzs/Ltr	16.86	18.38	17.50
	Customs Processing Fee (TZS 4.80/Lt)	Tzs/Ltr	4.80	4.80	4.80
	Weights & Measures Fee (Tshs. 1.00/Lt)	Tzs/Ltr	1.00	1.00	1.00
	TBS Charge	Tzs/Ltr	1.24	1.24	1.24
	TIPER Fee + 18% VAT	Tzs/Ltr	0.20	0.20	0.20
	Actual Demurrage Cost (USD 1.617/MT)	Tzs/Ltr	2.31	2.52	2.40
	Actual Ocean Losses (DAP Terms)	Tzs/Ltr	-	-	-
	Surveyors Cost (Actual TENDERED Rate: MSP=USD 0.099/MT; AGO=USD 0.051/MT; IK=USD 0.107/MT)	Tzs/Ltr	0.14	0.08	0.16
	Financing Cost (1.00% CIF)	Tzs/Ltr	9.24	8.76	8.63
	Regulatory Levy	Tzs/Ltr	6.10	6.80	3.50
	Evaporation Losses (0.5% MSP, 0.30% GO % IK)CIF	Tzs/Ltr	4.62	2.63	2.59
	Petroleum Marking Cost ($5.782/CM VAT inclusive)	Tzs/Ltr	10.85	10.85	10.85
	TOTAL LOCAL COSTS (LC)	Tzs/Ltr	**57.36**	**57.26**	**52.87**
	GOVERNMENT TAXES				
	Fuel Levy	Tzs/Ltr	263.00	263.00	-
	Excise Duty	Tzs/Ltr	339.00	215.00	425.00
	Petroleum Fee	Tzs/Ltr	50.00	50.00	50.00
Sub Total	**TOTAL GOVERNMENT TAXES**	**Tzs/Ltr**	**652.00**	**528.00**	**475.00**
Plus	Charges payable to other Local Authorities and Executive Agencies	Tzs/Ltr	18.00	18.00	18.00
Plus	OMCs Overheads & Margins	Tzs/Ltr	110.00	110.00	110.00
	WHOLESALE PRICE CAP (DSM)	Tzs/Ltr	**1,761.05**	**1,589.58**	**1,518.86**
Plus	Retailers Margin	Tzs/Ltr	95.00	95.00	95.00
Plus	Transport Charges (Local)	Tzs/Ltr	10.00	10.00	10.00
Price	**PUMP PRICE CAP (DSM)**	**Tzs/Ltr**	**1,866**	**1,695**	**1,624**
Preceding DSM Cap Wholesale Prices (01.04.2015)			**1,650.20**	**1,566.63**	**1,549.56**
% Change in Cap Wholesale Prices			6.72%	1.46%	-1.98%
Preceding DSM Cap Pump Prices (01.04.2015)			**1,755**	**1,672**	**1,655**
% Change in Cap Pump Prices			6.32%	1.37%	-1.86%

SOURCE EWURA

ADDITIONAL PRODUCTS TO BE IMPORTED THROUGH THE BULK PROCUREMENT SYSTEM

The government notice No. 59 which was published on 15/03/2013 (the Petroleum (Bulk procurement) Regulations, 2013) has included Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) and Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) in the list of products to be imported under the bulk procurement system.

PICL is working on the modalities of coordinating importation of HFO and LPG under the bulk procurement system. PICL in support of TBS is working on the harmonisation of HFO specifications. The discussions are on the final stages[9]. PICL is currently evaluating the existing infrastructures for the importation of LPG and preparations of the tender documents and contract for the importation of LPG and HFO. Coordination of importation of LPG and HFO shall start soon after completion of the needed documents, harmonisation and HFO specifications and evaluating the existing infrastructures[10].

PRODUCTWISE TENDER VS WEIGHTED AVERAGE TENDERS

PICL has received recommendations to start product wise tenders. We have done initial evaluations of the proposal and we are of the opinion that it is importation to start tender by discharge point. See analysis on the table below;

From the analysis there seems not to be any potential benefits which could be realised by doing product wise tender. The table below shows that, product wise tender will not big benefit to the country compared to the risks associated to it. There are also many other unknown factors which could affect the premiums and wipe out the price differential benefits. These factors could be due to

- Loss of the benefits of huge volumes especially on Jet A1 and IK
- Dangers of safety posed on carriage of Jet A1/IK and PMS on one vessel
- Freight charges due to low volumes and so affecting the premiums

[9] PICL General

[10] *Ibid*

Tender #	Winner	Volume as per Tender Document (MT)				Weighted Average Lowest Premiums				Product Wise Lowest Premium				Possible OMC Financial Savings on Product wise Tender (IN USD)				
		Gasoil	Mogas	JetA1	IK	Gasoil	Mogas	JetA1	IK	Gasoil	Mogas	JetA1	IK	Gasoil	Mogas	JetA1	IK	Total
1	AUGUSTA ENERGY SA	361,878	162,058	37,550	-	56.880	65.880	58.880	58.880	56.880	65.880	58.880	58.880	-	-	-	-	-
2	AUGUSTA ENERGY	386,716	181,602	32,569	-	64.970	74.670	59.670	59.670	60.190	74.670	59.670	59.670	1,848,502	-	-	-	1,848,502
3	AUGUSTA ENERGY	417,196	198,812	29,454	2,550	54.680	36.180	53.180	53.180	54.680	36.180	51.380	51.380	-	-	53,017	4,590	57,607
4	ADDAX ENERGY SA	138,500	59,200	26,400	7,600	51.020	53.670	65.870	65.870	51.020	39.800	40.000	40.000	-	821,104	682,968	196,612	1,700,684
5	ADDAX ENERGY SA	219,600	89,680	24,100	8,500	38.660	50.210	51.680	51.680	38.660	40.200	51.680	51.680	-	897,697	-	-	897,697
6	ADDAX ENERGY SA	130,000	52,050	22,200	6,250	38.880	90.350	56.420	56.420	38.880	82.000	56.420	56.420	-	434,618	-	-	434,618
7	AUGUSTA ENERGY SA	202,700	85,700	23,900	6,050	50.930	112.550	92.840	92.840	50.930	98.230	69.000	69.000	-	1,227,224	569,776	144,232	1,941,232
8	GAPCO TANZANIA LTD	178,900	73,300	24,520	6,150	41.700	72.900	67.200	67.200	41.700	72.900	64.000	64.000	-	-	78,464	19,680	98,144
9	GAPCO TANZANIA LTD	213,688	67,150	28,850	1,350	45.600	41.700	63.600	63.600	45.600	41.700	63.600	63.600	-	-	-	-	-
10	AUGUSTA ENERGY	159,560	88,970	14,970	1,500	48.980	40.680	64.180	64.180	45.900	40.680	55.550	55.550	491,445	-	129,191	12,945	633,581
11	GAPCO TANZANIA LTD	185,198	80,306	11,976	2,550	48.300	36.000	69.000	69.000	48.300	36.000	62.880	62.880	-	-	73,293	15,606	88,899
12	AUGUSTA ENERGY	207,380	100,590	16,500	2,750	42.880	46.880	55.880	55.880	40.500	42.500	54.000	54.000	493,564	440,584	31,020	5,170	970,339
13	AUGUSTA ENERGY	224,922	102,810	20,535	3,850	43.430	19.990	54.180	54.180	43.210	19.990	49.200	49.200	49,483	-	102,264	19,173	170,920
14	AUGUSTA ENERGY	236,712	102,653	16,650	3,520	42.880	46.880	55.880	55.880	40.500	42.500	54.000	54.000	563,375	449,620	31,302	6,618	1,050,914
15	AUGUSTA ENERGY	249,068	95,146	14,693	1,600	49.780	52.780	58.780	58.780	49.780	50.100	53.848	53.848	-	254,991	72,466	7,891	335,348
16	GAPCO KENYA LTD	160,259	52,824	10,047	-	45.300	55.200	50.100	-	39.194	30.000	50.100		978,541	1,331,165	-	-	2,309,706
17	GAPCO KENYA LTD	172,833	61,694	15,597	1,400	36.900	64.200	45.900	45.900	32.000	45.646	45.900	45.900	846,882	1,144,670	-	-	1,991,552
18	ENOC AFRICA LIMITED	148,127	45,625	19,491	1,050	36.100	68.200	44.900	44.900	36.100	48.150	44.900	44.900	-	914,781	-	-	914,781
19	AUGUSTA ENERGY	155,999	54,670	14,905	3,100	39.160	59.070	45.800	45.800	38.124	59.070	45.000	45.000	161,615	-	11,924	2,480	176,019
20	GAPCO KENYA LTD	172,151	62,353	19,600	3,017	41.700	57.000	50.400	50.400	41.000	57.000	49.730	49.730	120,506	-	13,132	2,021	135,659
21	GAPCO KENYA LTD	175,580	74,346	20,222	3,017	43.500	30.300	48.000	48.000	41.330	30.300	48.000	48.000	381,009	-	-	-	381,009
22	GAPCO KENYA LTD	157,432	82,541	12,672	1,000	33.900	37.800	50.100	50.100	33.900	37.800	50.100	50.100	-	-	-	-	-
23	ENOC AFRICA LTD	156,083	103,730	13,472	1,000	34.900	47.950	48.800	48.800	34.900	47.950	48.800	48.800	-	-	-	-	-
24	AUGUSTA ENERGY SA	177,295	112,544	18,308	1,200	41.880	45.280	50.480	50.480	40.800	45.280	50.480	50.480	191,479	-	-	-	191,479
25	ADDAX ENERGY SA	162,771	107,096	11,058	700	42.429	44.823	52.410	52.410	42.429	44.823	52.410	52.410	-	-	-	-	-
26	ENOC AFRICA LTD	156,863	115,490	26,269	1,250	38.140	54.200	53.890	53.890	36.540	54.200	48.700	48.700	250,981	-	136,336	6,488	393,804

27	AUGUSTA ENERGY SA	180,156	105,343	25,258	1,200	30.840	48.640	47.840	47.840	29.820	48.640	47.840	47.840	183,759	-	-	-	183,759
28	ADDAX ENERGY SA	125,701	82,873	17,826	1,150	34.680	55.260	47.700	47.700	34.680	55.260	47.700	47.700	-	-	-	-	-
29	ADDAX ENERGY SA	141,283	69,112	21,526	725	45.750	64.500	47.700	47.700	45.750	64.500	47.700	47.700	-	-	-	-	-
30	AUGUSTA ENERGY SA	166,607	71,858	15,065	1,150	39.100	64.860	52.090	52.090	38.830	64.860	52.090	52.090	44,984	-	-	-	44,984
31	ADDAX ENERGY SA	174,183	67,599	14,807	1,400	33.600	53.400	53.400	53.400	33.600	53.400	48.167	48.167	-	-	77,485	7,326	84,811
32	SAHARA ENERGY DMCC	146,431	86,115	12,486	1,000	41.627	61.816	48.757	48.757	40.080	61.816	48.540	48.540	226,529	-	2,709	217	229,455
33	ADDAX ENERGY SA	164,694	107,090	11,454	-	39.360	43.590	53.490	-	39.360	41.860	47.748	-	-	185,266	65,769	-	251,035
34	GAPCO KENYA LIMITED	198,677	139,178	12,689	2,250	36.780	28.320	53.640	53.640	36.780	28.320	42.880	42.880	-	-	136,534	24,210	160,744
	Total	6,605,143	3,142,108	657,619	79,829									6,832,653	8,101,720	2,267,651	475,259	17,677,282

The need to have tender by discharge point is due to the discharge logistics whereby AGO is discharged at SPM while other products are discharged at KOJ, also small volumes for IK and JET A1 which do not guarantee the benefits of economies of scale.

ADVANTAGES OF THE BULK PROCUREMENT SYSTEM

Since the establishment and implementation of the Bulk Procurement system, we have witnesses a number of benefits; including:

1. Transparent tendering system which leaves all involved parties happy. The tender is opened in public and witnessed by all interested bidders. The results are announced soon after completion of the evaluation process and the winner gets the notice of award on the same day.

2. BPS has proved effectiveness in controlling the cost of fuel importation there even has been an increase in awareness and support from oil marketing firms on the system usefulness[11].

3. Reduction of demurrage cost. Initial Oil Marketing Companies paid demurrage up to a maximum of 45 USD per MT with the introduction of BPS demurrage has dropped to 1.20 USD per MT per day. This has helped in reduction of the use of forex and to a large extent has reduced the cost of petroleum products. The system has definitely helped in cutting down demurrage charges as well as assuring availability of fuel to cater for domestic demand and transit cargo," said the GM, noting that the aim is to supply high quality petroleum products at low cost and timely.[12] Before the introduction of BPS vessels were waiting for more than 60 days to be able to discharge, currents the vessels are waiting for a maximum of three days[13]. Below are the details of demurrage cost after the introduction of BPS.

4.

[11] https://24tanzania.com/bulk-procurement-cut-fuel-import-costs-in-tanzania/ accessed on 08/05/2015

[12] PICL GM Mr Michael Mjinja

[13] *Ibid*

TENDER	MONTH OF ORDER	TERMS	WEIGHTED AVERAGE DEMURRAGE
		YEAR 2012	
BPS 1	Jan-12	CIF	4.560
	Feb-12		6.010
BPS-2	Mar-12	CIF	9.910
	Apr-12		18.700
BPS-3	May-12	CIF	27.610
	Jun-12		35.910
BPS-4	Oct-12	DAP	3.760
BPS-5	Nov-12	DAP	1.660
BPS-6	Dec-12	DAP	6.940
		YEAR 2013	
BPS-7	Jan-13	DAP	10.440
BPS-8	Feb-13	DAP	9.840
BPS-9	Apr-13	DAP	7.050
BPS-10	Jun-13	DAP	2.070
BPS-11	Jul-13	DAP	1.200
BPS-12	Aug-13	DAP	1.320
BPS-13	Sep-13	DAP	2.000
BPS-14	Oct-13	DAP	2.830
BPS-15	Nov-13	DAP	2.090
BPS-16	Dec-13	DAP	5.780
BPS-17	Jan-14	DAP	1.400
BPS-18	Feb-14	DAP	1.420
BPS-19	Mar-14	DAP	1.150
BPS-20	Apr-14	DAP	1.630
BPS-21	May-14	DAP	2.550
BPS-22	Jun-14	DAP	1.796
BPS-23	Jul-14	DAP	1.557
BPS-24	Aug-14	DAP	1.800
BPS-25	Sep-14	DAP	1.757
BPS-26	Oct-14	DAP	1.308
BPS-27	Nov-14	DAP	2.290
BPS-28	Dec-14	DAP	1.580

YEAR 2015			
BPS-29	Jan-15	DAP	1.770
BPS-30	Feb-15	DAP	1.850
BPS-31	Mar-15	DAP	1.980

SOURCE PICL

5. The bulk procurement of petroleum products ironed the need of improving petroleum discharging facilities at the port of Dar es Salaam, where by the Government constructed the SPM which to a larger extent has helped an improvement in discharge efficiency and reduction of demurrage cost.

6. Known center of importation of petroleum product. The Bulk Procurement System has made it easy for OMCs to import petroleum products through PICL. Even new comers now know where to go so as to get petroleum products.

7. The source of petroleum products is known hence there are very minimal risks of getting into international litigation resulting from international treaties.

8. Petroleum products are imported at clear and known terms. This has made it possible to have fair competition in the petroleum business. The Deputy Minister for Energy and Mineral Resources, Charles Mwijage, when he officiated at a training Programme organized by Petroleum Importation Coordinator (PIC) Ltd and the First National Bank (FNB).Said that with the previous system where oil importers operated individually, the process was cumbersome, and more than USD60m was lost annually[14].

9. Control of quality of imported petroleum products. With the single importation point and the quality control measures set by PIC, there is assurance that all imported petroleum products are within the approved specification. PICL manages to reject a vessel which comes with off-spec product

[14] http://www.123tanzania.com/?module=news&action=newsdetails&news=6730#sthash.3kSnhtaX.dpu accessed on 08/05/2015

10. Costs of importation of petroleum products are known. This has made it possible for the responsible Authority (EWURA) to use accurate data when setting prices of petroleum products. To a larger extent this has helped in stabilizing pump prices of petroleum products.

11. Security of supply of petroleum product. With the introduction of BPS there is guarantee that there is and there will be no challenges/ threat to the security of supply of petroleum product. PICL and EWURA are working so closely in monitoring the stock and immediate measures are always taken.

12. Improvement in Cash collection[15] . Accurate data in relation to imported volumes hence efficiency and increase in revenue collection. The volumes for the imported petroleum products are known well in advance before floating tenders when OMCs are placing orders for petroleum products and later actual quantity received as established by the appointed surveyor.

13. With Bulk procurement system it is possible to establish Ocean Losses through actual data produced by marine surveyors, for this reason, the amount of ocean loses payable which was in the pricing formulae has been greatly reduced, were as the charge was estimated to be between 0.25 percent to 0.5 percent now the ocean loss rate has been to 0.0 percent for some imported cargoes[16].

CHALLENGES FACED BY PICL IN COORDINATING BULK PROCUREMENT SYSTEM.

Despite of all the benefits, the implementation of bulk procurement system is facing a number of challenges. The challenges are as highlighted below,

1. Oil Marketing companies failure to open letter of credit or pay for their share of imported petroleum products. Weak financial base that impedes timely payment to

[15] http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/national/Bulk-buying-system-improves-cash-collection/-/1840392/2317988/-/qxwt6w/-/index.html accessed on 08/05/2015

[16] EWURA MAY 2013 NEWS LATTER page 7

suppliers remains one among the serious challenges facing PIC while inadequate storage facility to accommodate local and transit fuel cargo is also another problem faced.[17]

2. There is no single receiving terminal; this has caused inefficiency in discharging petroleum products as it takes too long for the vessels to complete discharge of petroleum products.

3. OMCs Poor importation planning. This has been to a larger extent increased OMCs to fail paying for their ordered volumes, and limited ullage resulting from over ordering and speculating.

4. Inflexibility of some of the suppliers in confirming LC? some of the suppliers are issuing very limited number of LC conforming banks.

CONCLUSION

The bulk procurement system has enabled the industry to stabilize as the importation is not only coordinated, but also in advanced, the OMCs large and small, get the benefits of the principles of bulk is cheaper while the general public get the assurance that the products in the market are of a desired quality but there is a steady supply and the prices are known at least over a period of time. The government has been able to see a rise in the taxes/revenues collected from OMCs since it is now more difficult to dump products that are on transit into the local market just as it is difficult to under or declare consignments. While the advantages are far greater than the challenges, the system is fairly new and if it were a human being it would still be going to nursery school if at all. There is need for the citizenry to understand the industry and the way it works, know the mechanisms for complaints where need be.

[17] https://24tanzania.com/bulk-procurement-cut-fuel-import-costs-in-tanzania/ accessed on 08/05/2015

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Unemployment: the anatomy, origin and elusive solutions

Bituro Paschal Kazeri

Abstract

This paper based on experience and the content review of public discourse; tries to look at the origin, anatomy, cause, and control measures of unemployment. The paper establishes that the causes of unemployment are well known; effort has been employed to control it; but the desirable result of a world where everyone could at least find job is not in sight. This seriously questions our good understanding of unemployment. Guided by historical, socialization, and incapability perspectives; the paper suggests that proper and adequate socialization could be the key to the survival in the prevailing society driven by culture of consumerism and money.

Key words: unemployment, work, consumerism, socialization

Introduction

Unemployment is a well known term. What does it mean? The electronic search surfaced some definitions of unemployment advanced mostly by economists. The big catch was from ILO. The ILO definition of unemployment covers people who are: out of work, want a job, have actively sought work in the previous four weeks and are available to start work within the next fortnight; or out of work and have accepted a job that they are waiting to start in the next fortnight (http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/index.html).

On the other site it was suggested that unemployment is an economic condition marked by the fact that individuals actively seeking jobs remain unhired. Unemployment is expressed as a percentage of the total available work force. The level of unemployment varies with economic conditions and other circumstances. http://www.investorwords.com/5838/unemployment.html#ixzz3TzpyQUoj (March 09, 2015).

The shortest of all definition described unemployment as the state of being jobless and looking for work (www. boundless.com- March 09, 2015)

A critical look at those definitions suggests that it is not easy to define unemployment. Likewise it is not easy to attribute it to individuals (Standing, 2000). Despite of that background, the policy makers have embarked on the easiest side of unemployment- measuring it. As a result all what we have is information about the number of unemployed and scheme to help them. Standing (2000) doubts how this could be possible in the absence of the definition and criteria for attribution.

The fact that the definition of unemployment and the criteria of attributing it to individuals is elusive does not mean it does not exists. Unemployment is real. Burawoy (2015) proposes how we should behave in such situation when writing about inequality. He advances:

> *"To face unequal (substitute it with unemployment) world requires us to interpret and explain it, to be sure but also to engage it; that is to recognise that we are part of it; that we are partly responsible for it."*

The world population and occupation at a glance



Figure 1: The world population by occupations

Source: http://fundersandfounders.com

World unemployment rate



Figure no.2: The world unemployment rate

Source: ILO, 2015

The United Nation reported in 2011 that the world population has reached 7 billion and called the leaders of the world to brace for the big challenge (UN, 2011). As reported by in figure 1, fundersandfounders.com suggests that twenty seven percent (1.9 billion) of the world population is made up of children aged 0-15 years. These are too young to work, although in some area this group provides or is exploited as child labour. Twenty percent (1.4 billion) are engaged in agriculture carrying the burden of producing food for all of us. Eight percent of the population (0.577 billion) are too old to work, but in developed countries is allowed to continue to work because of abnormal population characteristic. Entrepreneurs share stands at six percent (0.4 billion) of the total population. These four groups make about 61% of the world population and can be assumed that they do not sell their exchange labour. On the other hand industrial activities provide jobs to 11 % (0.8 billion) of the world population;

while 24 % (1.7 billion) are service providers. Only 4% (0.43 billion) of the world qualify to be classified as unemployed.

Data collected by and reported by ILO in 2014 suggest that unemployment is on the rise. The world economy could not take on board 202 million job seekers. This is an increase of 5 % as compared to the situation in 2013. Young job seekers are the most hit by unemployment. In Sub Sahara Africa, youth (15-24 (29 in some countries) years old) unemployment stood at 8 per cent in 2015. This group is further classified as youth Neither in Employment, Nor in Education or Training (NEET) (ILO, 2014). The future is not promising. Basing on the data, ILO predicts unemployment will worsen, with the record to read 215 million jobless by 2018. While the economy may add about 40 million jobs each year, this will not match with about 43 million job seekers that will be generated.

The situation will be made even worse by and with the change of demand based on skill criterion. Individuals with skills in security, care giving, law, software stands better chances as compared to those possessing book keeping and clerical skills (ILO, 2015)

Unemployment in perspective

Historical perspective

The first attempt should be to fix unemployment in a time frame expecting that the process could lead us to the origin of unemployment. While undergoing that process, we ought to consider the meaning of key words appearing in the definitions: want, seeking, work, job, hire, and economy.

Creation of the world has never been taken seriously by science. However, sociologists study religion where they encounter the belief that this world is a result of six days hard and smart work of God. Not only that, but also sociologists have also looked at how through the bible,

some societies have acquired a new work culture. It is further made to be believed that God having created a good working environment order man to work.

> *"The LORD God took the man and put him in the Garden of Eden to work it and take care of it (Genesis 2: 15).*

But the man God created is rational meaning to say had to be motivated to work. What is there then that could motivate man to work? Religious belief provides the answer:

> *"But if anyone does not provide for his relatives, and especially for members of his household, he has denied the faith and is worse than an unbeliever" (Timothy 5:8).*

The world is no longer what God presented to man and the good environment has undergone transformations (Beck, 2000.1999,1992 & Elliott, 2002). Karl Polanyi (1944) has termed it as the great transformation. Agrarian traditional society where everyone worked evolved into industrial society. In turn, the industrial society also evolved giving way to the service society, where finding a work to do is increasing becoming difficult.

In that background, work as a means of providing for self is vanishing. Instead many men only work in exchange for monetary gain. This is what is called employment a condition where labour imbedded in man turns to be a commodity for sale. Thus, when there is no money to buy that exchange labour, the resulting condition is unemployment. In the absence of job, most men have opted to stay idle.

The force behind all that is capitalism in its wholeness and forms. Unemployment is a by-product of capitalism resulting from the alienation of the majority from the ownership of the major means of productions. It is essential for the survival and increased profitability of capitalist economy (Forstater, 2002).

However, further developed especially technological advancement is altering the work society defined by capitalism. Beck (2000) argues that the work society as we have known it is coming to an end. More and more people are ousted from their jobs by smart technologies.

All but the highest-level workers are now unsure of their jobs and incomes. The idea of middle-class security is eroding. Work or labor patterns are becoming fluid, part-time, entrepreneurial, free-lance, and self-directed. The idea of the permanent job has disappeared, leading to insecurity. The declining of mortality rate and rise of life expectancy translate into limited opening for new job seekers leading to high rate of unemployment.

Socialization perspective

In response to the metamorphosis of the environment, the agents of socialization namely and in particular families, peers, religion, and school have formed their subject into exchange labour sellers. Parents line up their children and put them in a path that could land them a good job. Religious homilies are increasingly avoiding mentioning that not working, not providing for self is sinful. The education system is job seeking oriented. In the same spirit of transformation, the families, peers groups, religion, and school suggests that in the same manner, the government ought to ensure that there is equal opportunity for all men to be able to sell their labour force meaning also to say every labour force presented for sale must be bought. This bit the market sense.

Incapability perspective

This perspective was developed and applied by Contemporary African researchers on older population issues, who felt that the modern theory was not an effective tool in explaining declining societal support towards the older population (National Academy of Sciences, 2009). The incapability perspective could be a useful tool of trying to understand, interpret, and explain unemployment. Labour, indeed exchange labour is a commodity placed in the market by these who have been socialized so; and these who have volunteered to sell it. These should meet with the willing and capable buyers. What the world is experiencing if objectively considered tell three things. One, the exchange labour commodity is there in plenty. Two, the need of that exchange labour is also there

in plenty. Three, the wish to buy the exchange labour is also there in abundance but is compromised by incapability of the buyer.

Tanzania presents a good case study of incapability. The government through the Higher learning students loan board extend loan expecting to recover it from the graduates upon landing employment. That shows Tanzania's capability. However, the government and the private sector cannot provide work for all the graduates. It should not be mistaken that not taking all the job seeker means that the need for their service is not there. For example while the need for sociology, law, mass commutation, and economist graduates is higher, a lot of them cannot be taken because of the budget limitation.

Discussion

Employment (the opposite condition of unemployment) is elevated to a status of a right even though the debate is on going about where to place it- natural or human right (Sen, 2000; Tool, 1998). If treated as natural right; employment cannot be given or denied. Where treated as a human right, employment becomes a subject of rationality and enacted laws. It is certain that what prevail is the later at the expenses of the former. Tool writes:

> *"The natural right to employment ... is a non-empirical, non-experiential, extra-causal, conception of what ought to be. Its credibility derives from the acceptance of an antecedent metaphysical belief which cannot be integratively incorporated into the human inquiry process. The human right to employment is grounded in the continuum of factual experience and rational appraisals of actual consequences experienced and are validated by inquiry embedded instrumental social value theory. (1998: 285)*

The origin of this problem is adequately explained by the concept of the great transformation and fictitious commodity all credited to Karl Polanyi (1886-1964). His idea seems to be standing on nature and natural right. Polanyi and the Polanyians argue that, labour like land, money and knowledge added later by Polanyians; are not supposed to be sold or bought. Any deviation resulting from transformation, alteration and modification will result into serious social problem.

The data presented in figure 1 above are significant enough to stand on it and establish that only 4 % of the world population is directly affected by unemployment. However, the effects of unemployment on these 4 % of the global population do not spare the larger 96 % of the population. Forstater (2014) paint the big picture in his journal article titled Working for a better world: Cataloging arguments for the right to employment where he writes:

> *"Unemployment causes permanent losses in potential output of goods and services; economic, social, psychological and other problems resulting in poverty, crime, ill health (physical and mental), divorce, suicide, drug addiction, homelessness, malnutrition, poor pre-natal care, ethnic antagonism, school dropouts, broken families, etc.; deterioration of labor skills and productivity; and more (2014:2).'*

Unemployment leads to political instability. We have witnessed ruling government across the world voted or forced out of power for their failure in addressing adequately the issue of unemployment. Yet the replacing government also end up "committing'' the same sin and receive the same punishment resulting into the vicious circle of voting in and voting out of government for the same reason; but unemployment keeps soaring and claiming more and more victims.

Unemployment is more than a merely economic problem. It is a problem of dignity. In Africa, job is associated with manhood; who does not have job has no manhood; and who loses a job loses his manhood (Mosoetsa, 2014). Without work, one cannot have the experience of dignity which comes from being able to put food on the table. And unfortunately there are many young people … without work (Pope Francis, 2014).

That is so much true as pointed by Burawoy (2015) where he argued that we are all responsible for its occurrence, existence, and mitigation. We know that it exist because either we have experienced it or witnessed being experienced by the people we know. We know the causes of unemployment. We know its effects because we have been affected by it. We have

witnessed measures being formulated; put in place, implemented; yet the future with minimal unemployment seems to be a distance away.

It seems unemployment is assuming the same status as death, that advancement of health science and improvement of medical technology is no match. Should we borrow the socialization to death and apply it to unemployment? For we know, socialization is designed to prepare people to face and survive in a specific situation. The situation we are in is characterized by advancement of technology that limits the need of human labour.

It is amazing to note that the school system, the very system where technology is conceived, cannot tell their students the danger ahead. The school system fears losing tuition fees, which is on the rise despite the fact that the chance of one landing a job upon graduation is decreasing. On the other hand, the victims -students enrolled in the school system, do not suspect anything.

Irishman Mark Boyle, the man who lived for two years without money described what goes in mind of the students in school system. Boyle says in his final year of a business and economics degree what was in mind was plan to get a good job, make as much money as possible, and buy the stuff that would show society he was successful. It did not turn out to be the case. Boyle correctly blamed it on consumerism driven by market and money (http://www.trueactivist.com/the-man-who-lives-without-money/, March 12, 2015)

Standing (2014) argues that the failure of realization of plan makes the educated people to hold the feeling that they have been denied a future, denied opportunity to build their lives and careers, after being promised their qualifications would lead to that. They experience a sense of relative deprivation or status frustration. It has not ended there; unemployment is now a factor of exclusion. Pope Francis writes:

> “At this moment in time,... everything that does not bring in a profit is discarded. The youth (unemployed) are discarded, because they are without work.” Because of this, “the future of a people is discarded, since the youth represent the future of a people. We must say 'no' to this 'culture of waste'.”(October, 2014)

This is the experience we are recording everywhere in this world today. It is a global issue. It is the situation where as usual there are victims and perpetrators. The situation in which: the victims try to argue that their condition is due not to their personal failings, but to structural factors and policies; and pin point that the solution lies with structural change (Standing, 2014).

Forstater (2002) suggests that policies to address unemployment must recognize the effective demand problem; the structural change problem; the functionality of unemployment; the emergence of a hard-core, ‘unemployable; and socialization of investment (Forstater, 2002). Pope Francis is banking on policy makers, entrepreneurs, and politicians, whom he argues to create jobs. However, Gabriele Maglieri, a 28-year-old who is a farmer, like his father and grandfather before him, differs with Pope Francis. Gabriele Maglieri told the pope about the importance of family farms in producing traditional farm produces while protecting the soil, water resources and biodiversity (Wooden, 2014).

WHERE THE JOBS ARE: EMPLOYMENT SHARE BY SECTOR



Figure 3: World and sub-Sahara Africa: Employment share by sector

Source: ILO, 2014

SUB-SAHARA AFRICA: EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR



Figure 4: Sub-Sahara Africa: employment share by sector

Source: ILO, 2014

Data generated by ILO and presented in figure 3 & 4 supports Gabriele Maglieri's argument before the pope. Basing on the data of ILO, agriculture is a sector that can be maintained or activated to absorb the world unemployed. However, ILO findings show the trend where the share of agriculture slightly declines while the share of the service sector increases. The data also reveals that in Sub Sahara Africa like is elsewhere, the shift from agriculture to service sector does not speak well of the industry sector. Unfortunately we are not looking into that direction. To make the matter worse, the advocate for agriculture who can join Gabriele Maglieri in disseminating the accurate information that if we what to mitigate unemployment the solution lies with agriculture, are very few. Yet more, agriculture does not appeal to the youth who are mostly affected by unemployment. This indicates not only the failure of socialization, but also generation, dissemination and application of accurate information on and about unemployment.

Conclusion

We are living in a free market society where unemployment thrives well. Economists have attempted to understand it, and suggested measures to deal with it. Yet the monster has not only remained, but continues to claim more victims. In the word of Pope Francis the society has failed. If a properly diagnosed illness does not respond to the prescribed medication, that is failures, and the logical response is to review both the diagnosis and medication. However, it encourages noting that: understanding of the structure and socialization also makes sense to the economists. We are in the society were little can be done to change the past on which the present stands; and little about the future can be known and predicted. In deed the solution to unemployment lies with the socialization of the would-be job seeker that should focus on providing them with not just information, but accurate information on and about the cause and the anatomy of the consumerism system.

The above arguments line up well with structural functionalism. Structural functionalism see the society build with social institutions that determines social structures that in turn

determines social status of individuals in any society. The solution is imbedded in the same social system. In addition, it is important for members of the society to know and learn what is expected of them. Unfortunately this is not the case. We are not socialized adequately to survive in a consumer and money driven society. We have extended the free market to cover also our expectation. Our expectations are limitless and not subject to any condition. It is utter madness that provides ingredients that leads to insecurity, frustration and anomic society.

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UNDERSTANDING AND MITIGATING VOTERS' MISINFORMATION DURING POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS IN TANZANIA:

A COMMUNITY APPROACH

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1.0: Introduction

The relevant and timely information in for any voter is a sharpen weapon for fighting for democracy. The misinformed voter has limited vision and lacks appropriate political discussion in the election. Recently the Tanzanian society experiences an acute voters' turnout dropping. Voters are not willingly to vote for the General Election, but the registration turnout is constantly high. The question to ask, do voters well informed about their role and rights during the political campaigns? If yes, why is voters' turnout dropping? And, if no, why not well informed during the political campaigns? It is evidenced that in 2010 General Election there was an acute drop of voters turnout from 84.4 per cent in 2000 to 42.64 per cent (Figure 1). This is a problem that should be addressed empirically to explore the causal effect of this *political syndrome.*

Figure 1: Trend Analysis of the Voter turnout in Tanzania (1965-2010)



Source: Field data (National ElectoralCommission)-2015

The figure 1 shows the trend analysis of the voters turnouts in the General Election in Tanzania for 10 years from 1965 t0 2010. The trends show negative growths. The problem addressed empirically in this paper.

The objectives of this paper is critically to examine the meaning and nature of voters' misinformation in Tanzania, to identify the key actors and their motives in misinforming voters, to examine structures enabling acts of misinforming voters, to determine the impact of the voters' information in Tanzanian society and, to establish the strategies that mitigating acts of misinforming voters.

Voters in Tanzania now turn out to mistrust the political leaders, particular in the campaign process and during the elections, they claiming that, what they say during the campaign is what does not do in their offices, and this is a conflict between the voters and political leaders (Kappia, 2013).

The study used community methodology, explorative research design and the triangulation approach. The community methodology is an applied collaborative approach that enables community residents to more actively participate in the full spectrum of research from conception design to data collection, with a goal of influencing change in community voting behaviour, systems, programs or policies. This methodology is appropriately since involving and benefiting the community and researcher alike through the knowledge gained and actions taken, increasing the quality and validity of research and enhancing the relevance and use of data. The explorative research design is used to explore the voting behaviour on answering *why-questions* on the voters' turnout problem. The research design is relevant because it offers verification of the theoretical facts empirically to profile the reality of the problem. The triangulation approach is used to enhance the validity and reliability of the research findings. The study use both primary and secondary data. The data collected by conductinginterviews for 100 voters, in strata of political leaders and citizen (stratified sampling procedures in 7

seven districts), sampled from Mwanzaregion.The data analysed by using generalregression model.

2.0 Meaning and nature of voters' misinformation

The prevalence of voters' misinformation in contemporary Politicspollutes democratic discourse and undermines citizens' ability to cast informed votes and participate meaningfully in *public debate* (Brendan andJason, 2012).The phrase is mainly used in the United States, and has become popular since the mid-1990s.American pollster and political scientist Samuel Popkin coined the term "low-information" in 1991, means the low information or irrelevant information to the voters (Walker, 2008).Voters'misinformation simply refers to false information that is simply wrong irrespective of whether it is deliberate or accidental, a genuine mistake or criminal incompetence (Walker, 2008). The ideological views of most misinformed voters tend to be more moderate than those of high-information voters (informed voters) (Palfrey and Keith, 1987). Misinformed voters are voters that have low informed political information, Walker (2008) called them low-information voters and are less likely to vote, and when they do they generally vote for a candidate they find personally appealing(Lauderdale, 2012). They tend to be swing voters, and they tend to vote split-ticket more than well-informed voters do (Smalley, 2008).

This study broadens the definition of voters' misinformation and encompasses the time limit and relevance in integration of truthiness and accuracy of the traditional definition. The accurate delayed information tovoters,misinform voters, the irrelevant information to voters, misinform voters.

The nature of the voters' misinformation is explained by the two approaches established by this study.The society expect to be informed the information (ω) reflecting the base of time limit (γ), accuracy (μ), credibility (φ), relevance (ρ), and truthiness (τ). Therefore, the

information isthe function of time limit of information (time), accuracy (as it is, undistorted information), relevance (applicability or its importance to the society), credibility (trustiness to the society consumed the information) and truthiness (logical meaning).

That is,

$$\omega = f(\gamma, \mu, \varphi, \rho, \tau) \ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots \text{(i)}$$

Therefore, the information is directly influenced by time limit, accuracy, credibility, relevance andtruthiness on its acceptability.

I. Spectatorship Based Approach (SBA)

This approach is sometime known as democratic approach, the approach is characterised with the high social unity and patriotic on the national interest. From the general equation (i), the *voters expected information may bedirect proportional to the time limit, accuracy, credibility, relevance and truthiness.*

i.e.$\omega \propto \pi \ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots$ (ii)

Whereby theπ is the determinants of the expected information, namely time, accuracy, credibility, relevance and truthiness. In this relation, the society (voters) receives the expected information from the political leaders or campaigns. The voter will be well informed or high-informed if and only if the information is in time, accurate, credible, relevant, and true. In this approach, the higher the information acceptability in the society or by the voters,is the higher the degree of timely, accuracy, credibility, relevance and truthiness. In other word, the voters will accept the information if *holds the relations*(direct proportionality).

In this approach the society or voters areneutral to any political party, but actively to anyone who aspiring for candidacy. The voters expect to be informed on political knowledge from

any political partyavailable and judge the facts and validity oftheir promises. The votersjudge on the timing of the information, accuracy, credibility, truthiness and relevance, and trustiness.

II: Fellowship Based Approach (FBA)

This approach, voters assume that all information disseminated by their political leaders or campaigns arecorrect and relevance.

From the general equation (i*) the voters expected information may be inverse proportionality relations to explanatory variables of timing, accuracy, credibility, relevance and truthiness.*

i.e. $\omega \propto \frac{1}{\pi}$ ……(iii)

This approach ignores the facts of the informationand encouraging*empirical briefs of the voters.* Mostly, this approach is used by politician to encourage*political patrioticmembership* "kujengauzalendowachama", the practice later turns to be *political fellowship*. In the campaign period the members of the political party not willing to judge the facts or relevanceof promises offered by their candidates. The members of the political party or voters suffer from *psycho-mechanical disease knows as inertial problem.* The problem ofvoters to fail to identify their problem and solve sincethey are part of the problem, until another external agent or force comes to identify and put down the uprooting strategies. This is political opportunity to misinform their voters!

The approach has only one strong advantagethat strengthens the political parties and reduces the use of high convincing powers during the campaigns. It is not appropriate approach in the democratic countries since it doesn't offerthe opportunity to votersto watch and judges on their political candidates. This approach mostly applied in the developing countries like Tanzania, and most of the African countries.

III: Types and mode ofvoters' misinformation

Many researches done by various researchers such as Adam,*at el*. (2012), Herrnson,*at el.* (2015) and Johnson andRyu (2010) empirically confirm that political promises and voters demobilization practices are the ones of the voters 'misinformationinstruments used by many politicians.Rumours are insidious form of misinformation – one that is particularly damaging for the functioning of democracy – but they are misinformation nonetheless (Adam, *at el*, 2012). Keefer (2014) found that disinformation and delaying of information is techniques mostly used by government to misinform voters.

The study confirms at 72.2 per cent that rumours and political promises are mostly and common modesof voters' misinformation used by politicians.The finding supported by Adam, *at el*,(2012) who examine the political campaign in USA and finds the rumours as the common way used by politicians to misinformed the public for political interest.

The study confirms at 64.9 per cent that delayingof information and dis-information are modes used to misinform voters; this is mostly done by government, NGOs and media.

3.0 Actors and their motives in misinforming voters

Government that act as good economic stewards enjoy higher approval rates and receive more votes than government that oversee periods of lack lustre economic performance (Anderson, 2007; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000 and 2007).For the public interest, the government, legally misinform the societies (Kasper, 2009). Politicians typically try to get elected by offering people self-interested reasons to vote for them and in both cases voters, who are moved either by offers to buy their vote or by an election promise, are likely to deliberate on the basis of perceived self-interest (Kasper, 2009). Cornwall and Kessler (2015) investigating the actors of the misinformation of voters in Canada, confirms that

media plays significant role to misinform the voters if they are not managed, and have political interestsand corruptions ties. Anderson (2007) and Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000) confirms that the corrupted media lackstheir credibilityof informing the voters.Most of the media have limited sourcesof credibleinformation; this is weakening their ability and capability to inform the voters the relevant information (Adam, *at el*, 2012).

The study confirms that the key actors of the voters'misinformation are the political leaders, media during the electioncampaigns, government and NGOs. The 100 voters (including the politicians, particularly secretariesof political parties and "*wenyevitiwaMitaa"* were interviewed and found that about 67.7 per cent either strongly agree or agree that political leaders, media, government and some of NGO do misinform the voters.They motivated to inform the voters on bases of their interests, mostly public, political and financial interests. The study finds that the government may hide some factsof information (disinformation) for a time for the public interests and at the same time most of the media are not free of politicalinterests and their sources of information are not reliable and credible. Furthermore, it is found that, in the sake of the NGOs interest, the NGOs are being misinforming the voters due to the *advocacy pressure and needy*, they always biased on what they want be or what they advocate for. Mostly NGOs do from the pressure of fund.

4.0: Structures enabling acts of misinforming voters

Nadeau, *at el.* (2008) identified the structures and practices that open opportunity for prevalence of acts of misinforming voters and found that campaign gaps during the campaigns practices induce the information gaps to voters. This is due to either inadequately of the campaign time and campaigns aids that limit the coverage. Baton (2014) investigated how the voters are misinformed, found that voters with interests in politics are unaffected by misinformation, while less-political interested voters are affected. Kasper (2009) investigated the trade -off between buying vote and election promises, it found that it two directional

concept. The buying vote aims to influence the voters to vote for the political candidates, with high expectation that the candidate is going to work on the voter interests. Reedy *at el.* (2014), examining how the voters are misinformed comes with conclusion of that, politically motivated factual misperceptions on political issues.

Standle (2012) deeply examining the legal consequences of the political promises and found that no legal liability exiting or made by the candidate to promise or misinform the societies or voters. Analyzing the law of contract, found that the campaign promises lack the valid offer to the voters or vice versa.

This study finds about 77.8 per cent 100 voters (registered in 2010) in Mwanza asked confirm that of the lacking political knowledge or relevant information causes the voters' misinformation in Tanzania. The study evidence that about 68.3perecnt of the sampled voters confirm that, campaigning gap creates information gaps that lead to voters' misinformation in Tanzania. Practices of political parties to recruit *political fellowship* for their parties (Fellowship Based Approach (FBA)- that ignore the facts of the information is evidenced about to 81.3 per cent to be the major window for political leaders to misinform their voters. The practices facilitate more to misinform the voters since encourages to ignore the facts of the political information; voters suffer from psycho-mechanical effects of *inertia problem*.

The coverage of the campaigns and lacking of *campaign aids and funds* found to be significantly major cause of limited coverage of political campaigns as the results causes the information gaps among voters. The voters about 73.3percent of the interviewed confirm that language is another factor that causes the voters misinformation, particularly in rural areas. Mostly the language used by during the campaigns is not selective, it is unfamiliar to the most of voters in rural areas, and mostly they use Kiswahili and English to highlight their political interests

5.0: Impacts of acts of misinforming voters

Acts of misinforming voters have vivid impactsas many researchers confirm empirically. Cornwall and Kessler (2015) examining the Canadian election confirms that misinformation regarding election timing reduces voters turnout by 50 per cent relative to a control group , but that warning voters of potential misinformation beforehand removes this effects.Barton (2011) concludes that the effectiveness of voters' misinformation is strongly negatively related to the degree to which voters expected it.Hao*at el*. (2010) examining the campaign failure, confirms that, most the candidate fails to meet the voter expectations; they lack relevant information from their voters. Elinder (2015) and Abram (2008) examining the causal effect of the misinformation the voters. They found that political promises attract a lot of attention in election campaigns, but their effects on the voting remain largely unknown.

Furthermore, the ideological views of most misinformed voters tend to be more moderate than those of high-information voters (informed voters) (Abram, 2008). Misinformed voters are voters that have low informed political information, Walker (2008) called them low-information voters and are less likely to vote, and when they do they generally vote for a candidate they find personally appealing. They tend to be swing voters, and they tend to vote split-ticket more than well-informed voters do (Walker, 2008).

While there is ample evidence that merely informing voters of an upcoming election increases their likelihood of voting, there is only a weak suggestion that additional information about voting influences individuals' decision to go vote(Cornwall and Kessler, 2015). And while Grose and Russell have uncovered a message that reduces people's likelihood to go vote—reminding them of the public nature of their vote—it is unclear whether misinformation would affect the turnouts(Barton, 2011).

This study finds that one of the major impactsis dropping the voters' turnout at the polling stations in Tanzania. The study finds voters'misinformation is negatively related to voters'

turnout. The statistical descriptive on the empirical data from National Electoral Committee (NEC)of Tanzania is explains the relations (Table 1).

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Voters Turnover and Voters Misinformation Impact

Variable	N	N*	Mean	SE Mean	StDev
Voters Turnover	10	0	73.15	3.60	11.39
Voters Misinformation Impact (VMI)	10	0	0.3300	0.0533	0.1685

Source: Field Data (2015)

The table 1 show the distribution statistics of the voters turnout and voters' misinformation Impacts for the ten years from 1965 to 2010. The table profiles that mean or the voters'turnout in General Election in Tanzania isaveraged to 73.15 per cent, with estimated error of 11.39 per cent. The voters' misinformation Impact is averaged to 0.3300 or 33 per cent.

The voters 'misinformation Impact(VMI) is the ratio of the total number of the voters misinformed andnot voted or not likely to vote in future to the total numbers of the votersregistered in respectively to the populations.

The regression analysis was done to investigate the causal effects of the acts of misinforming voters and their willingness to vote (voters turnout). The study finds that there is a significant relation between acts of misinforming voters and their willingness to vote (Tab. 2 & Fig.2).

Table 2: Regression Analysis: Voters Misinformation Impact versus Voters Turnover

The regression equation is
Voters Misinformation Impact = 1.39 - 0.0145 Voters Turnover

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	1.38712	0.08228	16.86	0.000
Voters Turnover	-0.014451	0.001113	-12.99	0.000

S = 0.0380342 R-Sq = 95.5% R-Sq(adj) = 94.9%

Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	0.24403	0.24403	168.69	0.000
Residual Error	8	0.01157	0.00145		
Total	9	0.25560			

Source: Field Data(2015).

Table 2 shows the results of the regression model. The table profiles the causal effects of the voters' misinformation to voting behaviour. The model shows the negative relations that, the low information to voters tends to reduce the voters turnouts. That is, the more the voters misinformed is the less the voters turnouts.This model validates the need of campaigningfor reducing the information gaps. In other words, that is why political parties campaigns for their policies.The model is significantly valid at the 1 per cent significant level or 99 per cent level of confidence,since the P-Value is 0.000 less than critical or theoretical values of 0.01 or 1 per cent.

Figure 2: Regression model on voter's misinformation Impact and Voters Turnover



Source: Fielddata (2015).

Figure 2shows the relations between voters' misinformation and voter's turnout. The line of best fit is determined at R^2 =95.5%, strongly negatively related. Voters 'misinformation is measured in voters 'misinformation Impact (VIM), and voters 'turnout in percentages.

This finding confirms with Cornwall and Kessler (2015), Barton (2011) and Hao, *at el.*(2010) that explained the negative impacts of the voters' misinformation and the voters turnout.

6.0: Mitigating acts of misinforming voters

This study finds that rumours, political promises, delaying information, disinformation are the modes of the voters' misinformation in Tanzania. The study evidences that key actors of the voters' misinformation are political leaders, government, media and NGOs. The study confirms that the presence of campaign gaps is due to limited coverage of campaigns, shortage of funds for campaigning and shortage of campaigns aids, time limitation and languages barriers; these cause the misinformation of voters in Tanzania. The study evidences that major impacts of the voters 'misinformation are voters' turnouts, and voters' intimidation.

In the democratic country election is the non-stop process. To have effective, fair and democratic election, the need of effective campaigning process and voters' educating systems is inevitable. The voters should be educated, and well informed about the political messages. The effective campaigning is that offers large coverage with minimal cost; effective communication and voters' feedback accessibility.

The study recommends mitigating actions for the political parties and other stakeholders to improve campaign methodology. The traditional political campaigns in Tanzania are more *assaultive and defensive*. It is recommended to use *criticism and informative* political campaign methodology. National Electoral Commission (NEC) to increase the duration for campaigning, this will reduce the campaigning informational gaps; all actors of the elections should improve the means of communication, particularly channel and languages. Traditional campaigning model emphasizes public addressing, with *hard language*

(unfamiliar). The political parties should improve the political intelligences to increase the accessibility of the voters' feedback. This will improve the political campaign effectiveness and minimizing the voters' misinformation. The study evidences that about 66.1percent of the political leaders interviewed do not know what their voters need or interesting. The voters misinform their political leaders! In order the political parties to have effective campaign, the voters' feedback should be accessed and strengthening the *political intelligence.* This will reduce the political rumours and misinforming the voters. The behaviour of voters punishing the incumbents breached their promises by using re-election pressurizing should be encouraged by the voters and other stakeholders. The voters should be exercising Spectatorship Based Approach (SBA) that will allow them to judge or criticize the political messages. The political corruptions or briberies practices during the political campaigning should be watched closely and forbidden, and enhancement of transparency and accountability for actors, i.e. government, NGOs, media and political leaders should encouraged. This will increase the credibility and validity of sources of information for media and other actors. The introduction of *e-political campaign* will be encouraged since we are running to *e-lection and e-voting* in the new world of technology! This would cut the cost and increase the coverage of campaign.

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